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SUPREME COURT NO-CLEAR-MAJORITY DECISIONS
A STUDY IN STARE DECISIS
One of the basic postulates of the American case-law system is that the deci-
sion of a majority determines the result and establishes a precedent for use in
subsequent adjudications. In the Supreme Court, an "opinion of the Court" is
written expressing the reasoning agreed upon by the majority. The result plus
the reasoning found in the "opinion of the Court" determine the precedent
value of any particular case. In some cases, however, the majority will agree
only upon the result and not upon the supporting reasoning. Such no-clear-
majority decisions are to be distinguished from cases decided by an equally-
divided Court,2 where there is lack of majority agreement on the reasons for the
decision and also on the disposition of the case.3
A review of Supreme Court decisions indicates that since 1900 the Court has
decided thirty-five cases which may be described as no-clear-majority decisions.4
' In the Supreme Court, the decision of a majority of the justices sitting determines the
result. For a discussion of the problem of decision by less than a majority of the full Court
consult Andrews, Decisions by Minority Court, 18 Fla. L. 3. 238 (1944). This comment will
consider only those cases where there is, in effect, decision by less than a majority of those
justices sitting.
2 "Under the precedents of this court... an affirmance by an equally divided court is as
between the parties a conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged, but
the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting
prevents the case from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in this
or in inferior courts." Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213 (1910). Consult also Durant v.
Essex, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 107 (1868); Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U.S. 672 (1880); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
'A few no-clear-majority cases did involve some disagreement by the members of the
Court as to the disposition of the case. Nevertheless, the justices managed to reach some agree-
ment as to disposition although they failed to reach agreement as to their supporting reason-
ing. E.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
4 Prior to 1800 the Court rendered seriatim opinions. Since the Court adopted the system
of rendering an "opinion of the Court," a grand total of forty-five no-clear-majority decisions
has been rendered. The no-clear-majority decisions prior to 1900 will not be considered here.
Also not included are several additional cases in which, though less than a majority of the Court
specifically joined in one opinion, the separate opinions contain substantial agreement as to
rationale. E.g., Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). For other interesting
types omitted here, consult Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (where one of the five
majority justices would if possible overrule a decision which he joins the other four in following
to reach the result); Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938) (where there is five-justice agreement
on the merits including two justices who would have denied jurisdiction, but have not done so
because a clear majority-the other three and two dissenters-find jurisdiction to exist).
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Three-fourths of these have been handed down since 1938. While the factors
which have caused the increase in such decisions have been discussed,6 and their
potential effect on our system of judicial precedent has been considered, 7 the
actual use made of no-clear-majority decisions as precedent has not been
examined.
The Supreme Court has never discussed the precedent value of its no-clear-
majority decisions,8 although members of the Court have often indicated that
such cases lack authority.9 The textbooks on judicial precedent indicate that
theoretically the no-clear-majority decision stands only for its general result."0
5 "It is actually becoming unusual for all the Justices to join in the so-called 'opinion of
the court.' It happens not infrequently that votes of the Justices are divided three or more
different ways, so that there is no clear majority in favour of any single ground of decision."
Ballantine, The Supreme Court: Principles and Personalities, 31 A.B.A.J. 113 (1945).
6 Consult McWhinney, judicial Concurrences and Dissents, 31 Can. B. Rev. 595, 614-17
(1953), where the author suggests several reasons for the growth of multiple opinions in the
Supreme Court including the Court revolution of 1937 and the overthrow of the laissez-faire
Constitution, no polar issue for the new appointees to revolve around, personal differences
among the individual judges and the presence on the Court of unusually independent thinkers.
Also consult Palmer, Present Dissents, Causes of the Justices' Disagreements, 35 A.B.A.J.
189 (1949), giving twenty-six reasons for the growth of multiple decisions.
7 Consult McWhinney, op. cit. supra note 6, at 614: "Critics of the practice of the United
States Supreme Court in opinion-writing since 1937 point to a diminution in the value of the
judicial precedent as a guide to future decisions, and a consequent increase in the problems of
the business man and of the lawyer who must advise him." Also consult Ballantine, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 167; Palmer, op. cit. supra note 6, at 189.
8 See Alaska v. Troy, 258 U.S. 101, 111 (1922). The headnotes in no-clear-majority cases
all follow a fixed pattem-a statement of the facts followed by the procedural disposition of
the case. This is to be contrasted with the usual practice of including in headnotes to Supreme
Court cases various rules of law gleaned from the case. The Reporter of Decisions attaches no
special significance to the format of the headnotes. "As stated by the Court on several occa-
sions, the preparation of the syllabi is the sole responsibility of the Reporter and the syllabi do
not speak for the Court. Our practice with respect to [no-clear-majority decisions] is not abso-
lutely uniform. For each decision we prepare the kind of syllabus which we consider most
appropriate for that particular decision. Therefore, the value of any particular decision as a
precedent should be weighed in accordance with the usual standards and should not be judged
by the type of syllabus which we prepare. Such standards are very well stated in Wambaugh,
The Study of Cases (2d Ed., 1894)." Letter of William Wyatt, Reporter of Decisions, dated
November 15, 1955.
9 Consult Justices Black and Douglas dissenting in South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1949);
Justice Jackson dissenting in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
10 "Even when all the judges occur [sic] in the result, the value of the case as an authority
may be diminished and almost wholly destroyed by the fact that the reasons given by the
several judges differ materially.. . . 'There must be a concurrence of a majority of the judges
upon the principles, rules of law, announced in the case, before they can be considered settled
by a decision. If the court is equally divided or less than a majority concur in a rule, no one
will claim that it has the force of the authority of the court."' Wambaugh, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 50; "If all or a majority of the judges concur in the result ... but differ as to the reasons
which lead them to this conclusion, the case is not an authority except upon the general result."
Black, Handbook of judicial Precedent 135-36 (1912).
"The practice of this court is, not (except in cases of absolute necessity) to deliver any judg-
ment involved, unless four judges concur in opinion, thus making the decision that of a ma-
jority of the court." Marshall, C.J., in New York v. Miln, 8 Pet. (U.S.) 118, 121 (1834). Also
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It is the purpose of this comment to ascertain the actual use made of no-clear-
majority decisions as precedent-whether or not it is in accord with the theory
put forth in the texts. All the cases which have cited the principal no-clear-
majority decisions have been examined."
The thirty-five principal no-clear-majority decisions have been classified into
three groups: the "coordinate opinion," "dual majority" and "relative dis-
parity" cases. This classification was dictated by the presence, in decisions
which were utilized in the same general manner by later courts, of certain com-
mon elements. It is believed that these common elements furnish a significant
basis by which the pattern of later citations may be understood and perhaps
explained. This pattern may take several forms: citation for general result;"2 for




Seven no-clear-majority decisions have been cited primarily for their general
result. Each of these cases contains more than one majority concurring opinion.
Furthermore, the concurring opinions, although in disagreement as to the rule
of law applicable, are of approximately equal strength. 5 This group of cases
will be termed the "coordinate opinion" type, and may be divided into two sub-
groups, depending on the numerical alignment of the majority.
consult Dubuque v. Illinois Central R. Co., 39 Iowa 56 (1874); Mapes v. Burns, 72 Mo. App.
411 (1897); State ex rel. People's Bank of Greenville v. Goodwin, 81 S.C. 419, 62 S.E. 1100
(1908). The Supreme Court of Georgia has intimated that, in order for a case to have prece-
dent value, the rationale of the decision must have had the concurrence of the entire court.
Walton v. Benton, 191 Ga. 548, 13 S.E.2d 185 (1941).
1 The method followed in making this study has been to locate the no-clear-majority deci-
sions, "shepardize" them, and see how they are used as precedent. This type of empirical
approach seems unique in the field of stare decisis. One of the limitations that should be noted
with respect to this study is that not all citing cases were read in their entirety. They were
examined only to the extent necessary to determine the use made of the cited no-clear-majority
decision.
12 General result is used to indicate a citation which limits the precedent value of the cited
case to its particular facts. Thus, it does not include citations which give weight to particular
reasoning or rationale.
1" By definition, a court citing particular reasoning found in a no-clear-majority decision is
citing a view not agreed to by a majority of the justices sitting in the cited case.
14 In general, courts which cite a no-clear-majority decision as lacking authority do so on
the ground that it is a no-clear-majority decision. However, this is not always true. A citing
court may recognize the lack of a clear majority and nonetheless give the no-clear-majority
decision weight for particular reasoning or for the general result therein.
15 It is difficult to define "strength" in a precise manner. For the most part, an opinion is
strong if it lays down a clear rule of law which is general in its application. However, an
opinion which is limited, particular or technical may sometimes be strong simply because it is
so confined (although this rarely is the case). Other considerations such as the nature of the
prior law, the judicial needs of the citing judges and the prestige of the justice writing the opin-
ion may also be important. However, as used herein, "strength" does not depend on the
number of justices supporting a particular opinion.
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In the first subgroup, there is no plurality or minority opinion.'6 Rather, the
prevailing justices have split into two opinions, each containing equal numerical
support. Citation for general result may thus be expected, since two conflicting
opinions of equal strength, each of which is supported by an equal number of
justices, leave later courts with little basis for choosing between them. Three
cases fall into this first subgroup: Newark Fire Insurance Co. v. State Board of
Tax Appeals,'7 United States v. John J. Felin 6, Co.,Is and Hague v. C.IO.19
In Newark, the Court agreed 8-(1)10 on the result but split 4-4-(1) as to the
reasoning. In issue was a tax imposed upon the capital stock and surplus of a
New Jersey corporation by the state of New Jersey. The corporation claimed
that this was a violation of due process under the 14th Amendment on the
grounds that the business situs of the corporation's intangibles, and its tax
domicile, were in New York. Justices Reed,2' Hughes, Butler and Roberts con-
curred, stating that the facts were insufficient to establish that the corporation's
intangibles had a business situs in New York and to overcome the presumption
of a taxable situs in the domiciliary state of New Jersey. Justices Frankfurter,
Stone, Black and Douglas agreed with the result of the Reed opinion, but stated
that the situs of the intangibles was not decisive in disposing of the case. Rather,
this was simply a constitutional exertion of the taxing power of the state which
created the corporation here involved. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented
without opinion.22
Few subsequent cases have used the Newark decision as precedent. Those
which have, cite it primarily for its general result2 3 For example, Justice Stone,
joined by Justice Roberts, has stated that "the fact that the income-producing
property is physically located in the [foreign jurisdiction] does not foreclose the
[domiciliary] state from taxing its own corporations on the income derived from
the property,"' 4 with a reference to Newark. These cases usually recognize the
16 "Plurality opinion" as used in this comment refers to the opinion on the winning side in
which more justices concur than any other. "Minority opinion" refers to the opinion(s) on
the winning side to which a lesser number of justices lend their names. "Dissent" is given its
normal meaning.
27 307 U.S. 313 (1939).
"s 334 U.S. 624 (1948).
"9 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
20 Parentheses will be used throughout this comment to indicate the dissenting justices.
Numbers not in parentheses represent the concurring opinions.
2" Unless the context otherwise indicates, the first justice named in a reference to a par-
ticular opinion is the justice who wrote the opinion.
2The views stated by dissenting justices, unless important for an understanding of the
decision, will in general be given only brief notice.
23E.g., Superior Bath House Co. v. McCarroll, 312 U.S. 176, 182 (1941); In re Atkins
Estate, 129 N.J.Eq. 186, 206, 18 A.2d 45, 56 (1941); Commonwealth v. American T. & T. Co.,
382 Pa. 509, 516, 115 A.2d 373, 376 (1955); J. C. Penney Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 233
Wis. 286, 301, 289 N.W. 677, 684 (1940).
24 Superior Bath House Co. v. McCarroll, 312 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1941).
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lack of a clear majority. The rest give Newark little weight or cite the Frank-
furter opinion." Newark has been declared to be an "interesting discussion ' 28
but "not clear" 27 and, at best, "the decision [of the lower court was] not over-
ruled."28
Upon initial inspection, the Felin and Hague cases appear to present different
problems. Felin is a 3-3-1-(2) decision; Hague is a 2-2-1-(1-1) decision. The first
two opinions in each are equal in numerical support and are of approximately
equal strength. However, the third concurring opinion in each partakes of and
supports the first two opinions. The result is that Felin is numerically equivalent
to a 3j-31-(2) decision and Hague a 21-21-(1-1) decision. They are thus similar
in numerical alignment to Newark.
The Felin case arose from a governmental wartime purchase of pork chops.
The petitioner refused to sell at ceiling prices. The government nevertheless took
the goods, paying half the ceiling price on account. Petitioner obtained judg-
ment in the Court of Claims for the difference between the amount paid and
replacement cost at the time of the taking, the latter being greater than the
ceiling price. The Supreme Court reduced this recovery to the difference be-
tween the amount previously paid and the ceiling price for the products under
the Emergency Price Control Act.29
Justices Frankfurter, Vinson and Burton concluded that recovery was limited
by the ceiling price unless the petitioner proved a loss in total hog operations
-in which case greater compensation would be allowed. In the absence of such
proof, this opinion found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question of
due process. Justices Reed, Black and Murphy concurred. They agreed that the
ceiling price was the proper award, but rejected the Frankfurter reasoning. They
stated that "whenever perishable property is taken for public use under con-
trolled-market conditions, the constitutionally established maximum price is
the only proper standard of just compensation."3 This opinion would rule out
replacement cost altogether because consequential damages are not allowed
under government takings. It would not, however, exclude extra compensation
under special circumstances such as the lack of an adequate market to deter-
mine the price. Justice Rutledge partially agreed with both groups. He agreed
with Reed that the ceiling price was generally the proper compensation but
would qualify that view "by some limitations which would make adjustments
25 Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340,355 (1954); Southern Pacific Co. v. McCol-
gan, 68 Cal.App.2d 48, 69, 156 P.2d 81, 93 (1945); California Packing Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 97 Utah 367, 377, 93 P.2d 463, 468 (1939). It is perhaps significant that the Frank-
furter opinion stated the prior law.
"California Packing Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 Utah 367,377,93 P.2d 463,468 (1939).
27 Southern Pacific Co. v. McColgan, 68 Cal.App.2d 48, 69, 156 P.2d 81, 94-95 (1945).
28 In re Atkins, 129 N.J.Eq. 186, 206, 18 A.2d 45, 56 (1941).
29 56 Stat. 23 (1942). Recovery was also allowed for interest.
10 United States v. John J. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624, 643 (1948).
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beyond that price permissible when the circumstances of the taking are such
that they would entail destruction of property values beyond those inherent
merely in the property which the Government receives and uses."" He agreed
with Frankfurter to the extent that constitutional issues need not be reached in
the determination of this case because "under circumstances like these, the
legal market or ceiling price furnishes at least presumptively the measure of just
compensation," 2 and the owner must sustain the burden of proving further
loss. Where, as here, there is a market value he would not allow replacement
cost but would confine any extra recovery over ceiling to loss of good will when
proved. Justices Jackson and Douglas dissented.
The Felin case has been cited infrequently. "3 These citations have been pri-
marily for its general result.3 4 The Court of Claims in International Rice Co. v.
United States,"s for example, concluded that the Felin case refused to allow inci-
dental or indirect losses as part of just compensation. The split has also been
noted in some instances and little precedent value assigned to the case.3"
The Hague case involved a suit brought in a federal district court for an
injunction against the enforcement of a Jersey City ordinance. The ordinance
stated, inter alia, that "no public parades or public assembly in or upon the pub-
lic streets, highways, public parks or public buildings of Jersey City shall take
place or be conducted until a permit shall be obtained from the Director of
Public Safety.1 37 The plaintiff had been refused a permit to distribute printed
matter and to hold public meetings.
Justices Roberts and Black stated that the federal courts had original juris-
diction because this prohibition against the dissemination by citizens of infor-
mation concerning the National Labor Relations Act involved a question of
privileges and immunities under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution, as made operative by Section 24(14) of the Judicial Code. On the
merits, this opinion concluded that the ordinance on its face violated the privi-
leges and immunities of the natural-citizen plaintiffs; that, although the use of
1 Ibid., at 647.
2 Ibid., at 647-48.
33 In United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950), as a result of change
in personnel of the Court, a majority opinion was rendered on the Felin issue. This opinion,
by Justice Black, substantially expressed the Reed position in Felin. Any lack of subsequent
usage by citing courts, of course, may be a result of the clarification of the Court's position in
the Commodities case.
34 Swiss Federal Railways v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 357, 359 (Ct. Cl., 1953); Inter-
national Rice Co. v. United States, 97 F.Supp. 239 (Ct. Cl., 1951); United States v. Com-
modities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); Safeway Stores v. United States, 93 F.Supp.
900, 902 (Ct. Cl., 1950).
35 97 F.Supp. 239 (Ct. Cl., 1951).
36 Commodities Trading Corp. v. United States, 83 F.Supp. 356 (Ct. Cl., 1949). Also see
International Rice Co. v. United States, 97 F.Supp. 239, 243 (Ct. Cl., 1951); Safeway Stores
v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 900, 902 (Ct. Cl., 1950).
37 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 502 (1939).
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streets and parks may be regulated under the police power, such regulation
must be "in the interest of all"; and that privileges and immunities "must not,
in the guise of regulation,"3 8 be abridged or denied. Justices Stone and Reed
concurred in the result, but disagreed with the reasoning of Roberts with respect
to both jurisdiction and the merits. They pointed out that while there had been
no allegation of citizenship by plaintiffs, it was unnecessary since violations of
freedom of speech and assembly fall within the Due Process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which protects all persons regardless of citizenship. They
agreed that jurisdiction rested on Section 24(14) of the Judicial Code, but dis-
agreed as to what constitutional grounds put it there, relying again on the appli-
cation of due process "to all persons" rather than privileges and immunities "of
all citizens." Chief Justice Hughes agreed with Roberts and Black on the
merits, but with Stone and Reed on the jurisdiction question because he was
"not satisfied that the record adequately supports the resting of jurisdiction"3 9
on the ground suggested by Roberts. Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented
in separate opinions.
The Hague case has frequently been cited, principally for its general result.
For example, Supreme Court justices have cited the factual result eleven times.4
In addition the Court has considered the relative merit of the two major views
expressed in Hague. In 1940 the Court twice refuted arguments for extending
the privileges and immunities clause as had been suggested in Hague by Rob-
erts. 41 Again, in 1947, the Court favorably cited the Stone opinion following the
statement that "the responsibility of dealing with the privileges and immuni-
ties of their citizens except those inherent in national citizenship" should be left
to the states.42 The next year in a footnote, however, the Court favorably cited
Roberts' distinguishing of Davis v. Massachusetts43 and his argument for broad-
ening the privileges and immunities clause. The Court noted: "Though the
statement was that of only three Justices, it plainly indicated the route the
majority followed who on the merits did not consider Davis... controlling. '44
38 Ibid., at 516.
39 Ibid., at 532.
40 Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 404 (1953); American Communications Ass'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 403 (1950); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 30 (1949) (dissent);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 82 (1949); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504 (1946);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 538 (1945); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575 (1941); Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor
Dairies 312 U.S. 287, 319 (1941) (dissent); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
599 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
41 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 90 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236
(1940).
42 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947).
42 167 U.S. 43 (1897), which, in Hague, had been distinguished by Roberts, ignored by
Stone, and relied on by Butler in dissent.
44 Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948).
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In the same case, Justice Jackson in dissent indicated a view that the reasoning
of a no-clear-majority case has no precedent value when he stated that "the
case of Hague ... cannot be properly quoted in [the free speech] connection, for
no opinion therein was adhered to by a majority of the Court.... The failure
of six or seven Justices to subscribe to those views would seem to fatally impair
the standing of the quotation as an authority."
5
Cases which cite Hague's general result are also prevalent in the state and
lower federal courts. 46 However, in several instances, individual opinions were
cited and labelled as such.47 In several others, the reasoning of the Roberts or
45Ibid., at 568.
46 Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 254 (C.A. 3d, 1949); Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705,
706 (C.A. 10th, 1948); Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877, 881 (C.A. 8th, 1947); Snowden v.
Hughes, 132 F.2d 476, 477 (C.A. 7th, 1943); Bradford v. Somerset, 138 F.2d 308 (C.A. 6th,
1943); Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F.2d 24, 27 (App. D.C., 1942); Hammer v. Haver-
hill, 126 F.2d 87, 88 (C.A. 1st, 1941); Powe v. U.S., 109 F.2d 147, 150 (C.A. 5th, 1940); Local
309 v. Gales, 75 F.Supp. 620, 624 (N.D. Ind., 1948); United Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers of America v. Baldwin, 67 F.Supp. 235, 240 (D. Conn., 1946); Borchert v. Ranger,
42 F.Supp. 577, 580 (N.D. Tex., 1941).
State v. Jobin, 58 Ariz. 148, 118 P.2d 97, 100 (1941); Danskin v. San Diego School Dist.,
28 Cal.2d 536, 547, 171 P.2d 885, 891 (1946); In re Porterfield, 28 Cal.2d 91, 105, 168 P.2d
706, 715 (1946); In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 495, 515, 122 P.2d 22, 27, 37 (1942); Haggerty v.
Kings County, 117 Cal.App.2d 470, 477, 256 P.2d 393, 398 (1953); A. F. of L. v. Reilly, 113
Colo. 90, 97, 155 P.2d 145, 148 (1945); Hamilton v. Montrose, 109 Colo. 228, 233, 124 P.2d
757, 760 (1942); Trujillo v. Walsenburg, 108 Colo. 427, 430, 118 P.2d 1081, 1082 (1941);
Hord v. Fort Myers, 153 Fla. 99, 101, 13 So.2d 809, 810 (1943); Blue Island v. Kozul, 379 Ill.
511, 515, 41 N.E.2d 515, 518 (1942); Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Bellevue, 283 Ky. 152,
154, 140 S.W.2d 1024, 1025 (1940); New Orleans v. Hood, 212 La. 485, 488,32 So.2d 899, 900
(1947); Commonwealth v. Gilfedder, 321 Mass. 335, 339, 73 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1947); Com-
monwealth v. Anderson, 308 Mass. 370,372,32 N.E.2d 684, 685 (1941); Book Tower Garage v.
Local 415, 295 Mich. 580, 586, 295 N.W. 320, 323 (1940); Hames v. Polson, 123 Mont. 469,
478, 215 P.2d 949, 955 (1950); State v. Poulos, 97 N.H. 352, 356, 88 A.2d 860, 863 (1952);
State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 318, 18 A.2d 754, 761 (1941); State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137,
143, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940); Kovacs v. Cooper, 135 N.J.L. 584, 587, 52 A.2d 806, 807 (1947);
Herder v. Shahadi, 125 N.J.L. 153, 155, 14 A.2d 475,476 (1940); Vim Electric Co. v. Local 830,
128 N.J.Eq. 450, 455, 16 A.2d 798, 800 (1940); Burstyn v. Wilson, 303 N. Y. 242, 269, 101
N.E.2d 665, 678 (1951); People v. Kunz, 300 N. Y. 273, 285, 292, 90 N.E.2d 455, 461, 466
(1949); People v. Nahman, 70 N.Y.S.2d 29, 31 (N. Y. City Ct., 1947); People v. Levner, 30
N.Y.S.2d 487, 492 (N. Y. City Ct., 1941); People v. LaRollo, 24 N.Y.S.2d 350, 352 (N. Y.
City Ct., 1940); People v. McWilliams, 22 N.Y.S.2d 571, 575 (N. Y. City Ct., 1940); People
v. Friedman, 14 N.Y.S.2d 389, 394 (N. Y. City Ct., 1939); Commonwealth v. Reid, 144
Pa.Super. 569, 571, 20 A.2d 841, 842 (1941); Commonwealth v. Hessler, 141 Pa.Super. 421,
425, 15 A.2d 486, 487 (1940); State v. Superior Court, 24 Wash.2d 314, 326, 164 P.2d 662,
669 (1945); Shivley v. Garage Employees Local 44, 6 Wash.2d 560, 581, 108 P.2d 354, 363
(1940) (dissent); Fornili v. Local 297, 200 Wash. 283, 292, 93 P.2d 422, 426 (1939).
47 Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d 93, 98 (C.A. 8th, 1942); Douglas v. Jeannette, 130 F.2d
652, 656 (C.A. 3d, 1942); Oney v. Oklahoma City, 120 F.2d 861, 864 (C.A. 10th, 1941);
Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 86 F.Supp. 1006, 1016 (W.D. Ark., 1949); Williams v.
Miller, 48 F.Supp. 277, 279 (N.D. Cal., 1942); Buxbom v. Riverside, 29 F.Supp. 3, 4,8 (S.D.
Cal., 1939); Ghadiali v. Delaware State Medical Soc., 28 F.Supp. 841, 844 (D. Del., 1939);
Watchtower v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 347, 79 N.E.2d 433, 436 (1948); In
re Chirillo, 283 N.Y. 417,436,28 N.E.2d 895,903 (1940).
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Stone opinions was used and reference made only to the case in general.48 A
few cases have noted the Hague split. Some of these used the factual disposition
as authority;49 others attempted to reach conclusions based on the several
opinions.5 0
The second subgroup of principal cases which are cited most frequently for
their general result have, like the previous subgroup, at least two conflicting
concurring opinions of approximately equal strength. The second subgroup dif-
fers, however, in that the number of justices concurring in each opinion is not
equal. There is thus a plurality opinion and an equally strong, but conflicting,
minority opinion."1 The equality of strength seems to indicate that these cases
would be cited in the same manner as those in the first subgroup. Here, how-
ever, the numerical superiority of one opinion over the other may serve as justi-
fication for some courts to accord it greater weight, and thus cite the case for
its plurality opinion. There are four cases in this second subgroup: National
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater,52 Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Minnesota,8'
Downes v. Bidwell" and Terry v. Adams.8 5
The Tidewater Court split 3-2-(2-2). The action was commenced in a Mary-
land federal district court by one corporation, of the District of Columbia,
48 Walton v. Atlanta, 181 F.2d 693, 694 (C.A. 5th, 1950) (Stone opinion). The great ma-
jority of these cases use the privileges and immunities rationale of Roberts without stating
that it was not a clear majority view. A. F. of L. v. American Sash & Door Co., 67 Ariz. 20, 37,
189 P.2d 912, 923 (1948); Rescue Army v. Munic. Ct. of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.2d 460, 477, 171
P.2d 8, 19 (1946) (dissent); Payroll Guarantee Ass'n v. Board of Education, 27 Cal.2d 197,
205, 163 P.2d 433, 437 (1945) (dissent); People v. Duffy, 79 Cal.App.2d 875, 878, 179 P.2d
876, 878 (1947); In re Whitney, 57 Cal.App.2d 167, 170, 134 P.2d 516, 518 (1943); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 135 N.J.L. 64, 67, 50 A.2d 451, 453 (1946); Watchtower v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
69 N.Y.S.2d 385, 392 (S.Ct., 1947); People v. Kieran, 26 N.Y.S.2d 291, 296 (Nassau County
Ct., 1940); A. F. of L. v. Bain, 165 Ore. 183, 192, 106 P.2d 544, 549 (1940); Hall v. Com-
monwealth, 188 Va. 72, 88, 49 S.E.2d 369, 377 (1948).
49 Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 F.2d 245, 248, 249
(C.A. 7th, 1942) (Allopinions agreed there was no jurisdiction under section 24(1). ); George v.
United States, 196 F.2d 445 (C.A. 9th, 1952) (All opinions agreed that the ordinance forbade
free speech to everyone.); Thomas v. Casey, 123 NJ.L. 447, 448, 9 A.2d 294, 294 (1939);
People v. Freidman, 14 N.Y.S.2d 389, 394 (N.Y. City Ct., 1939); Fornili v. Local 297, 200
Wash. 283, 292, 93 P.2d 422, 426 (1939) (Both opinions held the ordinance void.).
50 City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F.2d 661, 664,665 (C.A. 1st, 1941) (The several opinions
leave doubt as to whether section 24(14) removes the $3000.00+ jurisdiction requirement.);
Robeson v. Fanelli, 94 F.Supp. 62, 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y., 1950) (Only three justices agreed that
privileges and immunities are protected when no petition for redress is involved and therefore
the question has not been authoritatively determined.); State v. Fowler, 79 R.I. 16, 21, 83
A.2d 67, 69 (1951) (Roberts discussed privileges and immunities and possibly overruled Davis,
but this is not decisive and the Supreme Court should speak again "so the courts would have no
reason to be misled in the future.").
51 Consult discussion in note 16 supra. 53 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
2 337 U.S. 582 (1949). 54 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
35345 U.S. 461 (1953), discussed in note 93 infra.
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against another, of Virginia. Jurisdiction was based solely on diversity of citi-
zenship. The lower courts had held unconstitutional the federal statute"s which
conferred diversity jurisdiction on the federal district courts in civil actions in-
volving District of Columbia citizens. The Supreme Court reversed.
Justices Jackson, Black and Burton upheld the constitutionality of the
statute in question on the grounds that although the District of Columbia was
not a "state" for diversity purposes under Article III, Congress under its Article
I power to legislate for the District of Columbia could confer jurisdiction on
Article III courts and that this was a constitutional exercise of its power to pro-
vide a forum for District citizens. Justices Rutledge and Murphy concurred in
the judgment but voiced a strong protest against the reasoning used by Jackson.
Instead, it was argued that the Court should declare the District of Columbia
a "state" under Article III. This would make the District of Columbia a "state"
for diversity purposes and would allow cases involving District of Columbia
citizens to come into Article III courts on diversity grounds alone. Justices Vin-
son and Douglas dissented on the ground that Congress has no power under
Article I to extend the jurisdiction of Article III courts (thus agreeing with
Rutledge) and that the District of Columbia is not a state under the diversity
clause of Article III (thus agreeing with Jackson). Consequently, they con-
cluded that the statute was unconstitutional. Justices Frankfurter and Reed
rendered a separate dissent arguing essentially the same points.
Thus, Rutledge, Murphy and the dissenters (a majority of the Court) agreed
that Congress has no power under Article I to extend the jurisdiction of Article
III courts. Similarly, a majority of the Court, the dissenters plus Jackson, Black,
and Burton, agreed that the District of Columbia was not a state for diversity
purposes.67
Considering its importance, Tidewater has been cited infrequently. This
paucity of citation may have resulted because the case was decided recently and
the issue involved does not arise often, or it may have resulted from the great
confusion created by the Jackson and Rutledge opinions as to the precedent
value of the case. In spite of the paradoxical alignment of the justices only two
cases have pointed out the disagreement on the Court. Siegmund v. General Com-
modities Corp., 8 relied on Tidewater's general result59 in applying that case to a
controversy involving citizens of territories. The Siegmund court held Tidewater
56 62 Stat. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §1332 (1948).
67 Frankfurter aptly pointed this out in the conclusion of his dissent: "A substantial ma-
jority of the Court agrees that each of the two grounds urged in support of the attempt by
Congress to extend diversity jurisdiction to cases involving citizens of the District of Columbia
must be rejected-but not the same majority. And so, conflicting minorities in combination
bring to pass a result-paradoxical as it may appear-which differing majorities of the Court
find unsupportable." 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1949).
Is 175 F.2d 952 (C.A. 9th, 1949).
51 The clearest use of the case is for its general result. Also consult Menashe v. Sutton, 90
F.Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y., 1951).
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controlling and stated that it "upheld the constitutionality of the Act... as
applied to an action between a citizen of the District of Columbia and a citizen
of a state."8 0
A more revealing decision is that of Green v. Teffeteller6" where both plaintiff
and defendant relied on Tidewater. The court noted that "the divergent reason-
ing employed by the justices in sustaining the constitutionality of the 1940
jurisdictional Act... provides support, apparently at least, for the divergent
positions taken here." 2 The court described the "divergent reasoning" of the
two opinions, indicating very clearly that the case has precedent value only for
its final result and not for the reasoning involved. "Each of the two groups of
justices rejected the theory of the other, and the four dissenting justices rejected
both theories, the result being that constitutionality of the 1940 Act was upheld
without the support of any controlling reason. The conclusion to be drawn from
that result is that precedent is established by the vote of the justices, not by the reason
given for their votes." (Italics added.)63
Finally, two cases have cited Tidewater for a proposition-"this provision
[the provision of the Constitution granting Congress legislative power over the
District of Columbia] is to be harmonized with Article III, Section 2, Clause 1"4
-which seems to be derived from Jackson's reasoning. Conversely, a general
statement in O'Toole v. United States65 can be construed as an endorsement of
the Rutledge reasoning. In attempting to determine whether a member of the
National Guard of the District of Columbia is an employee of the United States
for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the court stated: "If the District
of Columbia is a separate political community, it may in a qualified sense be
called a 'state,'" citing Tidewater.66
In Northwest Airlines, the question was whether or not Minnesota could im-
pose a personal property tax on Airlines, a Minnesota corporation, based on the
value of its entire fleet of airplanes, all of which were within the state for part
of the year. The Court held five to four that the tax was constitutional and
divided essentially 4-1-(4) on the grounds of the holding.
Justices Frankfurter, Douglas and Murphy thought that the tax was valid
because Minnesota was the domiciliary state and the aircraft were periodically
60 Siegmund v. General Commodities Corp., 175 F.2d 952, 953 (CA. 9th, 1949). The court
also quoted extensively from both opinions, possibly indicating that it felt that the general
result alone was not sufficient to support its opinion. Or, since both opinions supported the
court's decision, it may have been using them simply for rhetorical purposes.
6190 F.Supp. 387 (E.D. Tenn., 1950).
- Ibid., at 387.
63 Ibid., at 388.
6d Pang Tsu Mow v. Republic of China, 201 F.2d 195, 198 (App. D.C., 1952). Accord:
Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubenstein, 133 F.Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y., 1955).
65 106 F.Supp. 804, 806 (D. Del., 1952).
Ibid.
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within the state. They concluded that the fact that non-domiciliary states
could also tax the airlines did not abridge Minnesota's taxing power. justice
Black concurred "substantially" with the Frankfurter opinion. Justice Jackson
concurred in the judgment, contending, however, that the domicile was unim-
portant, that Minnesota offered no protection or services not rendered by other
states, and further that any apportionment principle of taxation should not
apply to airlines. He proposed a "home port" theory and would have made
Minnesota's right of taxation an exclusive one. Justices Stone, Roberts and
Rutledge dissented.
Northwest has caused a great deal of confusion for subsequent courts. In
Chicago v. Willet Co., 87 a majority of the Court utilized the separate rationales
of the concurring justices in Northwest.68 It was noted that in Northwest, Minne-
sota was both the state of incorporation and the home port, and the same fact
situation prevailed here with respect to a fleet of trucks. But Justices Reed and
Vinson, concurring in the judgment, thought that "nothing in the conclusion
and judgment of the Court in Northwest Airlines [made the above rule] appli-
cable to this situation, even if the 'conclusion' were an opinion of this Court.
'8 9
The two justices thus explicitly noted the weakness of Northwest as a prece-
dent.70 Justice Reed, in Braniff Airways Inc. v. Nebraska,71 attached greater
weight to the Frankfurter opinion's apportionment point, stating that it "seems
fair to say that without the position stated ... [there] the result would have
been the reverse." 2 Reed then found it necessary to distinguish away the
Frankfurter opinion despite the fact that at one point he recognized that there
was no majority opinion in Northwest. Several other cases have cited Northwest
for the Frankfurter view. For example, in Standard Oil Co. V. Peck,73 the Su-
preme Court, in a clear-majority opinion written by Justice Douglas and joined
by Justice Jackson and five others, directly referred to Frankfurter's opinion7
4
67 334 U.S. 574 (1953).
68 "This tax, as it falls on respondent, an Illinois corporation having its place of business in
Chicago, is clearly unassailable under the authority... we reaffirmed in Northwest Airlines.
." Ibid., at 577.
69 Ibid., at 581.
70 These justices would introduce a new rule in stating: "The corporation is taxable [by
Illinois] because it does intrastate business on the streets of Chicago." Ibid. Both, however,
returned to the apportionment principle in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590
(1954) (opinion of Reed, 3.).
-347 U.S. 590 (1954). 72 Ibid., at 602.
73 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
74 n Standard Oil Co. v. Glander, 155 Ohio St. 61, 71, 98 N.E.2d 8, 14 (1951), the Ohio
Supreme Court also cited the Frankfurter opinion as the holding by stating that the Supreme
Court in Northwest recognized the right of the domiciliary state to tax full ad valorem on per-
sonal property although the property passed through other states. In addition, the Supreme
Court has cited specific opinions, labelling them as such. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,
335 U.S. 80, 94 (1948) (Stone opinion); Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486,
492 (1947) (Frankfurter opinion); International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 423
(1947) (Stone opinion). In one instance the home port and state of incorporation theories were
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by stating that Northwest "allowed the domiciliary state to tax the entire fleet
.. operating interstate [because] it was not shown that 'a defined part of the
domiciliary corpus' has acquired a taxable situs elsewhere." 7 5
Thus, while Northwest Airlines has been utilized for its general result,7 the
Frankfurter view appears to have acquired some authority. Although not of ap-
preciably greater strength than the Jackson opinion, the numerical superiority
of the justices supporting the Frankfurter opinion appears to have given it
greater weight.7"
In the Downes case, the Court in effect split as they had done in Northwest,
3-1-1-(3-1), with one of the minority opinions agreeing in substance with the
plurality opinion. This was an action to recover import duties which had been
paid under protest for the transfer of goods from Puerto Rico into New York.
Shortly after the annexation of Puerto Rico, Congress passed the Foraker Act78
to provide temporary revenue and government for Puerto Rico. It included the
authority to collect duties on goods shipped from the island to the United
States. The plaintiff in the case claimed that this duty violated Article I, Section
8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, 9 which requires uniformity
throughout the United States with respect to duties, imports and excises.
combined as the holding. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 51
N.M. 332, 348, 184 P.2d 416, 426 (1947).
75 342 U.S. 382, 384 (1952).
7Writing for the Court in Willet, Justice Frankfurter cited the decision for what might be
called its general result. In a dissenting opinion in Braniff he again emphasized the inherent
perplexities of aviation taxation and stated that "the most important thing that was...
decided [in Northwest] was the refusal of the court to apply to air transportation the doctrines
that had been enunciated with regard to land and water transportation." 347 U.S. 590, 604
(1954). Frankfurter further indicated that he would limit the Northwest case to its own par-
ticular facts when he stated: "It was not too difficult in Northwest Airlines to allow Minnesota
to levy a personal property tax on the entire fleet of airplanes owned by a corporation of its
creation, the principal place of business of which was also in Minnesota." Ibid., at 607.
The problem which faced lower courts as a result of the Northwest decision is exemplified
by Mid-Continent Airlines v. Nebraska, 157 Neb. 425, 59 N.W.2d 746 (1953). The conclusion
of the court was that Northwest does "cast serious doubt on the right" of non-domiciliary
states to further tax where the domiciliary state has taxed ad valoren on full value. The
Nebraska court considers this problem "the cause of the major division of the Court." Ibid.,
at 430 and 748.
77 It should be noted that the structure of the opinions in Northwest and resultant citation,
to a large extent, of its plurality opinion almost puts it into the "technical minority" subgroup
of the "relative disparity" cases discussed in Section III B of this comment. However, it has
been placed in the "coordinate opinion" group because its citation pattern was felt to be in-
determinative and because its minority view (Jackson's) seemed closer to being "strong"
than "technical." In any event, Northwest certainly is a borderline case in regard to the
analysis used in this comment and illustrates the rather thin and arbitrary line dividing some
categories. A similar case is Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U.S. 434 (1914), which is discussed in
Section III B infra.
7s 31 Stat. 77, c. 191 (1900).
79 "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be Uniform throughout the United States."
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Justice Brown announced the judgment of the Court and delivered a separate
opinion in which he stated that Puerto Rico was not a part of the United States
under the clause in question, basing his conclusion on the proposition that this
section of the Constitution does not become operative on territories until Con-
gress so decides. In a separate concurring opinion, Justices White, Shiras and
McKenna agreed that the clause did not prohibit the duty. They based their
conclusion on the ground that the Constitution becomes immediately operative
in a territory when the United States acquires it, and that the question turned
on whether the particular clause became applicable. Their decision rested on
the thesis that the uniformity clause did not become operative until Congress
incorporated the territory. Justice Gray, in a separate concurring opinion,
agreed "in substance.., with the opinion of Mr. Justice White,"' merely
adding the argument that the government of territory acquired by war retains
its former laws until Congress approves a complete government. He, too, ac-
cepted incorporation by Congress as the point at which the revenue clauses
would become applicable. Justices Fuller, Harlan, Brewer and Peckham dis-
sented. Thus, five justices concluded that the revenue clauses were not in force
in Puerto Rico; four so concluding because the territory had not been incorpo-
rated, and one because Congress had not specifically stated that the clauses had
become operative.
Although the Supreme Court has frequently cited the result of Downes,8 the
citations have been usually qualified by a statement that the Downes Court
offered no conclusive rationale.8 2 The precedent value of Downes has also been
80 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 345 (1901).
81 Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 157, 164 (1901) ("[W]e held that Congress could
lawfully impose a duty upon imports from Porto Rico" [stated by Brown, Gray, Shiras and
McKenna] and "[tihe Court maintained ... [the view that] Porto Rico ... had not been so
made a part of the United States as to cause Congress to be subject... to the uniformity pro-
visions of the Constitution." [by White]); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S.
176, 181 (1901) ("in Downes... the conclusion of a majority ... was that ... duties on
goods imported from Porto Rico into New York... was valid" [opinion of the Court]);
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 124 (1904) ("The power of Congress to make rules and
regulations for the territory incorporated in or owned by the United States is settled.. ").
12 DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 201 (1901) (McKenna, Shiras and White complained in
dissent that in the instant case the Downes dissenters agreed with the Brown-Downes rationale
but had disagreed with it in the Downes case); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 158
(1901) (Brown, Gray, Shiras and McKenna noted that the Dowies "conclusion was reached
by a majority of the court by different processes of reasoning ... ." White did not expressly
note the disagreement but in discussing the Downes case, on two occasions confined his con-
clusion to the resulting judgment.); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176,
181 (1901) (A majority of the Court stated that, in Downes, "five concurred, although not on
the same grounds.... ."); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 154 (1904) (Peckham, Fuller
and Brewer stated: "I do not wish to be understood as assenting to the view that Downes...
is to be regarded as authority.... The various reasons advanced by the judges ... were not
concurred in by a majority of the court [and] are plainly not binding."); Rassmussen v. United
States, 197 U.S. 516, 531 (1905) (The Court, Brown and Harlan excepted, noted that the
White and Gray Downes rationale concerning the incorporation test was accepted by a
majority in a later case. Justice Brown discussed the two Downes majority views.); Alaska
v. Troy, 258 U.S. 101, 111 (1922) (The Court said that "in Downes... none of these opinions
were accepted by a majority of the court and statements therein are not binding upon us.").
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affected by the later decision of Dorr v. United States.83 There the Court split
5-3-(1), with a majority of Brown, White, McKenna, Holmes and Day basing
its conclusion on what some later decisions have interpreted as an acceptance
of the "incorporation" requirement of the White opinion in Downes.8 4 However,
Justice Brown later contended that Dorr did not substantiate the "incorpora-
tion" rule,85 because the point was not necessary to the decision. In some later
cases, members of the Court suggested that Downes itself went on the "incorpo-
ration" rule. 6 This may have resulted from the Downes plurality in favor of the
rule or from the influence the Dorr formulation had upon the doctrine.
The great bulk of lower federal court citations which are useful to this analy-
sis have been confined to noting the result of Downes.87 A few cases have pointed
out that the Downes Court was split. Those that did cited the resulting judg-
ment as the holding,88 indicating that the later cases cleared up the ambiguity, 9
or brushed the case aside as having no precedent value."8 Three cases intimate,
however, that the White opinion was the holding."' From all of these cases it
83 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
84 Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 520 (1905) (The Court, Justices Brown and
Harlan excepted, stated that the incorporation "reasoning [was] in effect adopted in the Dorr
case as the basis of the ruling."); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922) (The Court
there said that "the Dorr case shows that the opinion of... White of the majority in Downes
... has become the settled law of the court.").
8- Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 531 (1905). Justice Brown contended that
the Dorr case contained factors which came under both his and Justice White's Downes
rationale and that the incorporation rule was not necessary to the Dorr decision.
86 In Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 219 (1903), justices White and McKenna stated
that because Hawaii had not been incorporated during the period of time involved in the liti-
gation "the case is controlled by Downes... ." The majority opinions in Public Utilities
Commission v. Ynchausti & Co., 251 U.S. 401,407 (1920), and Hoover & Allison Co. v. Evatt,
324 U.S. 652, 673 (1945), also make reference to Downes in terms of the incorporation rule.
87United States v. Dorr, 23 S. Ct. 859, 860 (S. Ct. of Philippine Islands, 1902); Soto v.
United States, 273 Fed. 628, 633 (C.A. 3d, 1921) ("Territory acquired by treaty is... not a
part of the United States within.. . revenue clauses of the Constitution."); Depass v. Bidwell,
124 Fed. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y., 1903) ("It has been settled... that Congress had [the] power
... to impose duties on goods [etc.] brought into the United States from Porto Rico after that
island ceased to be a foreign country."); Crespo v. United States, 151 F.2d 44, 45 (C.A. 1st.,
1945); Miranda v. People of Porto Rico, 101 F.2d 26, 29 (C.A. 1st., 1938); Neuss Hesslein &
Co. v. Edwards, 24 F.2d 989, 990 (S.D.N.Y., 928); Santoni & Co. v. Rafferty, 10 F.2d 788,
789 (C.A. 2d, 1926); Lastra v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 2 F.2d 812, 813 (C.A. 1st.,
1924); International Mercantile Marine v. Stuart, 285 Fed. 79, 80 (S.D.N.Y., 1922); Sugar
Products Co. v. Lockhart, 279 Fed. 348,350 (C.A. 3d, 1922).
88 Nagle v. United States, 191 Fed. 141, 143 (C.A. 9th, 1911).
s9 Neuss Hesslein & Co. v. Edwards, 30 F.2d 620, 621 (C.A. 2d, 1929) ("The ambiguities
... have since been cleared .... "); Pugh v. United States, 212 F.2d 761, 762 (C.A. 9th, 1954).
90 United States v. Sprague, 44 F.2d 967, 981 (D.N.J., 1930) ("[W]e think [the Downes
case] rested upon the principles of political science.").
91 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 670 (C.A. 3d, 1953) ("[Ilt seems to be settled that the entire
Constitution does not extend of its own force to incorporated areas." The court also cited the
Dorr case to this passage.); Porto Rico Brokerage Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 605, 610
(Cust. & Pat. App., 1935); People of Porto Rico v. American R. Co. of Porto Rico, 254 Fed.
369, 371 (C.A. 1st, 1918) ("In Downes ... the relationship of Porto Rico apparently is not
recognized as that of a territory fully incorporated into the United States.").
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may be concluded that the chief precedent value of Downes was in its factual
result9" except in connection with Dorr and the later cases which served to re-
move the ambiguity caused by the split. 3
In summary, the "coordinate opinion" cases have been cited predominately
for their general results. As has been suggested, this is perhaps due to the pres-
ence of conflicting majority views of approximately equal strength and the con-
sequent absence of a basis for choice between these views. Occasionally, how-
ever, the presence of unequal numerical alignments appears to have caused later
courts to use the cited decision for the view stated in the plurality opinion. In
this situation, there is of course some basis for choice.
92 Three state cases have cited Downes on its decisional point. One used it for its general
result. People v. Bingham, 189 N. Y. 124, 129, 81 N.E. 773, 775 (1907). The second noted it had
been expanded by Dorr to make the incorporation rule that of the Supreme Court. People v.
Bingham, 117 App.Div. 411, 419, 102 N.Y.Supp. 878, 883 (1st Dept., 1907). The third is per-
haps the most interesting of all Downes citations, Miller v. Bank of Washington, 176 N.C.
152, 161, 96 S.E. 977, 981 (1918). This case was not concerned with the issues in Downes but
rather with the problem of how to dispose of a case in which the court has split in opinion.
To this end, one member of the court included a synopsis of nineteenth and early twentieth
century United States Supreme Court split decisions, primarily those with an equally divided
court. It was stated that in "Downes... all nine of the justices expressed their views; the
report of the case covered 154 pages. This was the case in which it was said that the court had
'filed nine dissenting opinions.'" Ibid., at 161 and 981. The judge, however, confined his con-
clusions to the equally-divided cases.
93 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), presents an interesting variation on the "co-
ordinate opinion" series. However, it is not significant for the purposes of this comment, due to
the absence of citing cases.
It involved the legality of excluding Negro voters from elections held by the Jaybird
Democratic Association, an organization consisting of all the qualified white voters in the
county. The Association had held a primary prior to the regular state primary (at which
Negroes were allowed to vote). The winners then filed individually for the state primary, were
never opposed and almost invariably won.
Justices Black, Douglas and Burton held that the jaybird's election violated the Fifteenth
Amendment, it being precisely the kind of election the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to
prevent. They argued that this Amendment is violated whenever a state permits a duplicate
election which in effect produces the "equivalent of the prohibited election." Justices Clark,
Vinson, Reed and Jackson concurred in result, although finding "state action" on a different
ground. They considered the Jaybird Association to be a political party, operating as "part
and parcel of the Democratic Party." And since the latter existed under the auspices of Texas
law, the case was controlled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), where the Court had
held that rules of a political party subject to considerable statutory control excluding Negroes
from voting in party primaries are a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Frank-
furter concurred singly, differing in reasoning from both the Black and Clark opinions.'He
found "state action" here insofar as county election officials clothed with the authority of the
state "share[d] in the subversion." Justice Minton in a lone dissent found no "state action" and
therefore no violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Thus, the Court split 4-3-1-(1), with the three different views being taken as to why the
Fifteenth Amendment was violated in this case. And, since each of these views seems equally
strong, Terry would appear to be what might be termed a triple "coordinate opinion" case.
Terry is quite recent and has been cited only twice, both times for its general result. Howard v.






A second group of no-clear-majority decisions, the "dual majority" cases,
bears a superficial resemblance to the "coordinate opinion" cases containing a
plurality and minority opinion. In substance, the "dual majority" cases involve
a 4-1-(4) numerical alignment with the plurality stating a strong rule in conflict
with the rationale set out by the minority. However, the minority seems to
agree with the dissent on the rule of law applicable, although differing in its
interpretation of the facts. There are thus two majorities-the plurality and
minority as to the result, and the minority and dissent as to the reasoning.
As might be expected, the "dual majority" cases have not been used in a
consistent manner by later courts. They are occasionally cited for their general
result, for a particular opinion or as carrying little weight. Furthermore, some
courts have used them for the proposition advocated by the minority plus the
dissent. Five cases fall into the "dual majority" category: Interstate Pipeline v.
Stone,9 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,95 United States v. PeeWee Coal Co.,98
Colegrove v. Green97 and Coleman v. Miller.98
The Interstate case, 9 in which the Court split 4-1-(4), involved a pipeline
located wholly in Mississippi which was used to pipe oil to the railroad, the rail-
road then shipping the oil out of the state. The state had imposed a tax on the
pipeline measured by the gross receipts of the business it did within the state.
Justices Rutledge, Black, Douglas and Murphy upheld the tax, stating: "We
do not pause to consider whether the business of operating the intrastate pipe
lines is interstate commerce, for, even if we assume that it is, Mississippi has
power to impose the tax involved in this case."'00 The tax was valid because it
was imposed on that portion of the business which was wholly intrastate.,'
Justice Burton concurred in the judgment solely on the ground that "the tax
imposed by the State of Mississippi was a tax on the privilege of operating a
pipe line for transporting oil... in intrastate commerce,' 01 2 and that no issue
94 337 U.S. 662 (1948). " 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
95329 U.S. 459 (1947). 97328 U.S. 549. (1946).
98 307 U.S. 433 (1939), discussed in note 140 infra.
9" A case closely related to Interstate is Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80
(1948). Both involved the same basic problem of state taxation and interstate commerce; both
were no-clear-majority decisions; both are usually cited together. Interstate, however, has been
cited predominantly as a case with little authority, while Memphis has been cited most often
for its plurality opinion. Memphis has therefore been treated as a principal case in a different
group. Consult Part I A infra.
100 337 U.S. 662, 666 (1948).
101 Justice Rutledge added several criteria for determining the constitutionality of the
statute: (1) tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce; (2) apportionment is
unnecessary; (3) no attempt to tax interstate activity outside of the state and (4) no possibility
of double taxation.
' 337 U.S. 662, 668 (1948).
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as to the validity of a tax upon the privilege of transporting oil in interstate
commerce was present. Justices Reed, Vinson, Frankfurter and Jackson dis-
sented, pointing out that the majority had used two separate theories to uphold
the tax. They construed the operations to be interstate transportation, and the
tax to be one exacted by the state for carrying on interstate business, measured
by a percentage of the gross income from that portion of the interstate com-
merce carried on wholly within the state. They concluded that such a tax was
unconstitutional. Thus, four justices would uphold the tax even on interstate
commerce. Burton concurred on the theory that only intrastate commerce was
involved. By implication, he would not uphold a tax on interstate commerce.
Burton thus differed from the dissent only in his interpretation of the facts and
not as to the proper rule of law.
Several subsequent cases have explicitly noticed the disagreement in Inter-
state. In Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, °3 a state tax on an interstate motor
truck freight carrier attached as a tax on the privilege of doing solely interstate
business. The district court frankly evaluated the trend of the Supreme Court
decisions. The Interstate case, as the latest expression of the Court, was inter-
preted to indicate that a majority of the Court-the four dissenters and Burton
-would hold a tax levied on the privilege of doing business solely interstate in
character to be a violation of the Commerce clause.
The court of appeals, 104 however, failed to agree with the lower court's use of
Interstate. The higher court stated: "So we shall set forth our analysis of the
legal situation and our reasoned conclusion as to the controlling law without
attempting to guess which justices or how many, if any, may agree with us....
In view of the divisions within the Court, there is [no] majority opinion which
can be relied upon as giving the rationale of the Court's decision."' 5 It was con-
cluded that Interstate had precedent value only insofar as the state tax was sus-
tained. Rather, the criteria laid down by Rutledge in Interstate were applied,
not because they represented the holding of the Supreme Court, but rather be-
cause the court of appeals agreed with Rutledge's reasoning.
The tax in the Spector case was not upheld by the Supreme Court. Justice
Burton, speaking for a clear majority of the Court (Vinson, Reed, Frankfurter,
Jackson and Minton), distinguished Interstate by stating that the tax in Spector
"is not collected in lieu of an ad valorem property tax."'1 6 Such a construction
of the facts in Interstate is not consistent with either the Reed or Rutledge
opinion and would seem to indicate that Burton was citing his own construction
of the Interstate facts. Justice Burton also cited the Interstate dissent for the
general proposition that exclusively interstate businesses are constitutionally
immune from a state privilege tax. In a parenthesis following the citation, how-
103 88 F.Supp. 711 (D. Conn., 1949).
104 Sub nom. Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 181 F.2d 150 (C.A. 2d, 1950).
105 Ibid., at 154-55.
ic0 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor. 340 U.S. 602, 607 (1951).
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ever, he indicated that the Interstate dissent had discussed the issue "on the
assumption that the activities were in interstate commerce."'07 This quote
merely corroborated the fact that, in Interstate, Burton agreed with the dis-
senters on the law but disagreed with their construction of the facts. 08 It ap-
pears then that in the Spector cases, no single judge or justice cited the Interstate
case for a clear holding.0 9
Other cases have also indicated an awareness of the disagreement in Inter-
state. In Martin Ship Service v. Los Angeles,"0 each of the Interstate opinions was
carefully analyzed. The California court concluded: "Even if the proposition
stated by the dissenting justices... still has any vitality, it is not controlling
here.""' Though the disagreement was recognized, the Rutledge opinion ap-
pears to have been accepted as controlling. Other courts"2 have similarly cited
the Rutledge opinion as the holding in Interstate while still others' 3 seem to have
construed the case through the eyes of Burton. Thus, Interstate may be said to
be "most confusing" for subsequent courts. The different usages of the case in-
dicates the confusing nature of a decision where a "majority" of the Court
actually are on the "losing" side.
The Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber Court also split 4-1-(4). The case
involved an abortive attempt to electrocute a convicted murderer which had
failed because of faulty equipment. The governor of Louisiana subsequently
issued a second death warrant fixing a new date for the execution. Petitioner
claimed the protection of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
stating that a second attempt at execution would be a denial of due process
because of the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment and the cruel
and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment." 4
107 Ibid., at 609.
108 Burton cited Interstate for a statement which seems to be a further elaboration of his
holding in that case: "Our conclusion is not in conflict with the principle that, where a taxpayer
is engaged both in intrastate and interstate commerce, a state may tax the privilege of carrying
on intrastate business and... may compute the amount of the charge by applying the tax
rate to a fair proportion of the taxpayer's business done within the state, including both
interstate and intrastate." Ibid., at 609-10.
109 Even the dissenters, Clark, Black and Douglas, cited Interstate by the reference: "See
opinion of Justice Rutledge in Interstate .... " Ibid., at 615.
110 34 Cal.2d 793, 803, 215 P.2d 24,31 (1950).
In Ibid., at 804 and 31. Accord: In re West Coast Cabinet Works Inc., 92 F.Supp. 636, 653
(S.D. Cal., 1950); Commonwealth v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 193 Va. 55, 65, 68 S.E.2d
137, 144 (1951). Cf. Stone v. Dunn Bros., 80 So.2d 802,805 (Miss., 1955).
11 Gulf Oil Corp. v Joseph, 307 N.Y. 342,348,121 N.E.2d 360,361 (1954); Keystone Metal
Co. v. Pittsburgh, 374 Pa. 323, 329, 97 A.2d 797, 800 (1953); Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 204 Okla. 518, 522, 231 P.2d 655, 660 (1951). Accord: Columbia
River Bridge Co. v. Washington, 46 Wash.2d 385,388, 282 P.2d 283, 285 (1955).
n1 Coleman v. Trunkline Gas Co., 218 Miss. 285, 295, 63 So.2d 73, 76 (1953); Coleman v.
Trunkline Gas Co., 61 So. 2d 276, 284 (Miss., 1952) (dissent).
114 Petitioner also claimed that he was denied equal protection of the laws and that he was
inadequately represented by counsel in the original trial. Both contentions were rejected sum-
marily in the Reed opinion.
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Justices Reed, Vinson, Black and Jackson assumed, without deciding, that
a violation by a state of the principals of these Fifth and Eighth Amendment
guarantees would constitute a violation of the Due Process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment but concluded that no constitutional provisions had been
violated on the facts of this case. Justice Frankfurter concurred but specifi-
cally rejected the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the states in the
manner in which the federal government is limited by the first eight amend-
ments. He thus would not rule on the claim based on the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments but rather favored a "case by case" interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. He concluded that since the second execution would not
be "repugnant to the conscience of mankind"115 there was no violation of the
Constitution. Justices Burton, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge dissented. They
seemed to agree with Frankfurter's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, stating that "[i]n determining whether a case of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment constitutes a violation of due process of law, each case must turn upon
its particular facts."" 6 Because this case involved capital punishment and con-
tained controverted facts as to whether or not the petitioner had received some
electrical current in the first attempt, they would remand the case to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana to examine the facts and dispose of the case in a
manner that would not violate the Constitution. They intimated that if the
facts proved that a current had passed through the petitioner's body, then a
second attempt at execution would violate the due process of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Thus one majority agreed that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was not coincident with the first eight amendments but disagreed
as to the possibility that there had been a deprivation of constitutional rights on
the facts of this case. Another majority agreed that there was no such depriva-
tion but differed as to assumptions regarding the proper application of the Fifth
and Eighth Amendment guarantees through the Due Process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The only clearly authoritative point upon which a majority
agreed was that no constitutional right had been violated upon the particular
facts of the Francis case.
Francis has been cited in eleven federal cases.117 It has never been used where
its rationale was decisive and thus has been accorded little weight in the federal
courts. The strongest, and perhaps the strangest, citation of the case appears in
11 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947).
n6 Ibid., at 477.
n17Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 560 (1950); Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9, 11
(1950); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 604 (1948); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,66 (1947);
Aero Transit Co. v. Commissioners, 332 U.S. 495, 500 (1947); United States ex rel. De Frates v.
Ragen, 181 F.2d 1001, 1003 (C.A. 7th, 1950); Smith v. United States, 177 F.2d 434 (C.A. 10th,
1949); Bryan v. United States, 175 F.2d 223 (C.A. 5th, 1949); Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250,
255 (C.A. 3d, 1949); Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F.Supp. 943, 951 (S.D. Cal., 1949);
United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F.Supp. 382, 388 (N.D. Ill., 1949).
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Application of Middlebrooks,"8 where it was stated that the Frankfurter opinion
coupled with the Burton dissent "substantially holds that cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted by a State is a deprivation of due process, contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment.""' 9 Perhaps "substantially holds" is indication enough
that the court was aware that Francis was not decided on the cited point.
Only two state courts have used Francis in any significant manner. The Su-
preme Court of West Virginia cited it for a proposition which it later clarified
to mean that rights proscribed to the federal government by the first eight
amendments "by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not because of the
individual amendments... may not be denied or abridged by any State." 20
The California Supreme Court agreed when it stated that "[i]nfliction of bar-
barous punishment [by a state] would not violate the Eighth Amendment; it
might violate the Fourteenth."' 2' These results were reached apparently by
coupling the Burton dissent with the Frankfurter concurring opinion. Such a
use is similar to that made of Interstate by the lower court in Spector, but varies
from the general use of the Interstate type of case. The few other citations of
Francis seem to lean toward citation of its general result. The case, however,
has been cited infrequently and is relatively weak in authority.
In United States v. PeeWee Coal Co. the owner of a mine, which the govern-
ment had seized in order to avert a strike, sued to recover operating losses for
the period of governmental control, alleging the seizure to be a violation of
the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Claims rendered judgment for the losses
attributable to government operation of the mine. Upon the government's
appeal the Court split in a 4-1-(4) alignment.
Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas and Jackson would have affirmed the
lower court decision because there was a "taking" of private property within
the Fifth Amendment requiring the government to pay "just compensation."
"Just compensation" in this case would not be the reasonable value of the
property's use, since PeeWee did not claim this, but rather the total operating
loss which the government assumed by taking over the property. Reed, con-
curring, agreed that there was a temporary "taking" under the Fifth Amend-
ment requiring the government to pay "just compensation," but would not re-
quire the government to pay for operating losses generally. Rather, where the
owner suffered a loss which would have occurred without the taking, he has
suffered no loss for which he should be compensated. But Reed agreed with the
Black disposition of the case, since the loss here suffered was attributable to the
government's operation.12 Justices Burton, Vinson, Clarke and Minton, dis-
"'s 88 F.Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal., 1950).
119 Ibid., at 951.
121 State ex rel. Cosner v. See, 129 W.Va. 722, 727,42 S.E.2d 31,35 (1947).
121 In re Wells, 35 Cal. 2d 889, 895 n. 1, 221 P.2d 947, 951 n.1 (1950).
"' They had given a wage increase in compliance with a War Labor Board directive which
Reed construed as having no legal sanction.
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senting, agreed that there was a "taking" but would not attribute any of the
loss to the government and therefore would not permit PeeWee to recover.
Thus, a majority of the Court (the Black group and Reed) agreed that there
was a "taking" in this case which entitled PeeWee to recover compensation."'1
Reed, in effect, agreed with the dissent as to the test for compensation but
disagreed on the facts. The Black group was then in the minority on its test-
that the government must bear all operating losses of a business which it
"takes."
PeeWee has been cited clearly only three times-each time for its general re-
sult rather than for any specific opinion. For example, in Sawyer v. United States
Steel Co."4 the lower court stated: "Only last year the Supreme Court held that
the 'United States became liable under the Constitution to pay just compensa-
tion' for a taking under circumstances closely parallel to those of the present
case," 15 citing PeeWee. Similarly, justice Douglas concurring, and Chief justice
Vinson dissenting, in the same case in the Supreme Court, cited the case for its
general result."'
Colegrove v. Green involved an action for a declaratory judgment that the
Illinois Apportioning Act of 190111 was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs claimed
that the population distribution for a pending election of representatives to
Congress was so disproportionate that the results of the election should be de-
clared invalid. The Supreme Court rejected this position, dividing 3-1-(3).
Justices Frankfurter, Reed and Burton considered these claims as presenting
a political question and refused jurisdiction, stating that this was a problem
for Congress and not the judiciary. Justice Rutledge concurred in the result
but disagreed with the political-question analysis. He concluded that, although
this was a case in which the Court had jurisdiction, it was also an action in
equity. He would have denied equity jurisdiction in this case-exercising the
discretion of an equity court-because of the imminence of the contested elec-
tion. Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissented, agreeing with Rutledge
that the Court had jurisdiction, and would have accepted jurisdiction. They stat-
ed that this was a justiciable controversy, that injury to plaintiffs had been shown
and that under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
the application of the Illinois statute should be declared unconstitutional. Thus,
in summary, three justices thought that there was no justiciable controversy
while a four-justice majority-the dissent plus Rutledge-thought that a jus-
13 This led the writer of the headnotes to state this as a conclusion of the Court-something
which he rarely does in no-clear-majority cases.
124 197 F.2d 582 (App.D.C., 1952), aff'd sub nom. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
25 Ibid., at 584.
"2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 631, 680 (1952). Also see Addison
v. Huron Stevedoring Co., 204 F.2d 88, 104 (C.A. 2d, 1953).
ml. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 46, §10-2.
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ticiable controversy was present. Yet a different majority, the plurality and
Rutledge, refused to grant the relief requested.
The Supreme Court, in a series of decisions involving issues similar to those
in Colegrove, has had occasion to refer to it. In the first,"5 a per curiam decision,
the Court refused to grant an injunction which would have prohibited use of the
Georgia county system of selecting candidates for public office. The action had
arisen on a claim, under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, that the system resulted in disproportionate representation. Only Justice
Rutledge disagreed with the decision of the Court. In a separate opinion he
noted that this case was very close to Colegrove but that in his opinion it was not
necessarily determined by that decision and that "the issues whether of juris-
diction, of discretion in exercising it, or of substantive right ... have not been
conclusively adjudicated by prior decisions of this court." He advocated "a
full hearing and consideration after argument here.' 2 9 It would appear that the
remainder of the Court was not willing at this time to attempt a clarification
of the Colegrove decision with an opinion in which a majority agreed. The Re-
ports are silent as to which justices sat at the argument for this per curiam de-
cision. However, if only the same seven justices were present, there was the pos-
sibility of producing a clear majority if the factor of an imminent election would
not require Justice Rutledge to exercise his interpretation of the equity court's
discretionary power. Rutledge's opinion does not illuminate this point.
Two years later a full Court considered a similar question in MacDougall v.
Green.10 The Illinois statute here in dispute"' required a new political party to
obtain twenty-five thousand valid signatures on a petition, of which at least
two hundred names were required from each of fifty counties. In a per curiam
opinion, five justices, Vinson, Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton, deciding
on the merits, refused to enjoin enforcement of the statute. Three of these
justices had refused jurisdiction in Colegrove on political-question grounds. The
other two-Vinson and Jackson-were not on the Colegrove Court. What dis-
tinguished the Colegrove statute from the one in this case was left unanswered.
Instead, Colegrove was cited for the proposition that "[t]he Constitution-a
practical instrument of government-makes no such [as asked for here] demands
on the States. " 2 However, this quote does not represent the rationale of any
of the three Colegrove opinions. Indeed, Justices Frankfurter, Burton and Reed
had said in Colegro'e that whatever demands the Constitution did make in this
area was for the legislature to decide and that the judiciary had no jurisdiction
128 Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946).
" Ibid., at 825. On the same day the Court also denied a rehearing on Colegrove itself.
Justice Rutledge advocated the reargument of Colegrove for the same reasons he gave in
Cook.
130 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
M Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 46, §10-2.
' MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948).
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over the constitutional question. It is unlikely that the Rutledge or Black opin-
ions in Colegrove could also be construed to support the quoted material since
the Black opinion came to the opposite conclusion and Rutledge had refused
to entertain jurisdiction at all." 3
The remaining four justices in MacDougall specifically pointed out that this
case was similar to Colegrove, and all four maintained their previous positions.
Justice Rutledge would have again refused equity jurisdiction because of the
imminence of an election. Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy would have
granted the injunction because of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Both groups cited only their own Colegrove opinions. Neither group suggested
that Colegrove could be authority either for or against their points of view.
The following year in South v. Peters,34 another case attacking the Georgia
county unit election system, Colegrove was cited as a case in which the Court
had refused to exercise its equity power because political issues-arising from
a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength-had been posed. This
new interpretation, adopted by seven justices, combined part of Frankfurter's
Colegrove opinion with part of Rutledge's,, but was not an accurate picture of
the two opinions. Frankfurter, in Colegrove, had recognized no equity power.
He had seen the problem as being one for the legislature and beyond the power
of the judiciary. And, of course, Rutledge had seen no political question in Cole-
grove. Thus a majority of the Supreme Court had again interpreted Colegrove
differently. justices Douglas and Black, in dissent, again pointed out that only
a minority of three justices had stated that Colegrove involved a political ques-
tion. They argued that the only reservation by Justice Rutledge against grant-
ing jurisdiction in Colegrove, the imminence of an election, was lacking in this
case. Consequently, they contended that jurisdiction should be granted since
a majority in Colegrove so held. Thus, in effect, they were citing the minority
and dissenting views in Colegrove.
Similarly, the use of Colegrove as precedent by lower courts does not present
a uniform pattern. It has been cited for its general result.Y3 5 "Whether it be that
the subject matter [the Georgia county unit system] is not of equitable cog-
nizance, or merely that equity should withhold its hand, we think the decision
in Colegrove ... requires us to deny equitable relief."'3 6 Other courts have spe-
"'3 Why they chose to make it appear that their new position was consistent with Colegrove
is not clear. It would have been possible to state that Colegrove presented no bar to redeter-
mining the issue because there had been no clear majority there.
134 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1949).
135 South v. Peters, 89 F.Supp. 672, 678 (N.D. Ga., 1950); Cook v. Fortson, 68 F.Supp. 624,
626 (N.D. Ga., 1946).
"I' Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F.Supp. 744, 747-78 (N.D. Ga., 1946). Other lower federal
court cases have cited Colegrove as denoting a reluctance to entertain jurisdiction when the
issues are of a "controversial nature," without explicitly stating a specific Colegrove rationale
on which to base this theory. Caven v. Clark, 78 F.Supp. 295, 298 (W.D. Ark., 1948) (poll
tax lists-political issue, and also question as to jurisdiction under Federal Declaratory Judg-
[Vol. 24
cifically stated that Colegrove had been decided on the political question point.
In these cases reference was made to the Frankfurter opinion as the opinion of
the "Supreme Court."' 37 Another view of Colegrove is illustrated by a court
which stated that it was a "most confusing" case.138 Similarly, it has been con-
cluded that "no 'law results from [Colegrove] ... [and it presents] the novelty
of sawing a justice in half' and having him walk away whole."' 39 This view would
appear to be an apt summary, and perhaps an explanation of the use of Cole-
grove as precedent. 140
ment Act); Pitts v. Board of Trustees, 84 F.Supp. 975, 988 (E.D. Ark., 1949); (separate and
equal facilities-where issues are explosive courts should proceed with great care); Butler v.
Wilemon, 86 F.Supp. 397, 399 (N.D. Tex., 1949) (separate and equal facilities-courts should
enter field of race relations conscientiously and carefully); Remmey v. Smith, 102 F.Supp. 708,
710 (E.D. Pa., 1956) (state reapportionment act-political question and discretion of equity
court).
'17Watts v. O'Connell, 247 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Ky., 1952); State v. Zimmerman, 261 Wis.
398, 412, 52 N.W.2d 903, 910 (1952). The former stated that Frankfurter was "speaking for
the court." The latter used the phrase "the United States Supreme Court in its opinion de-
clared... ," citing the Frankfurter opinion. It is also interesting to note that a dissenting
opinion in the Zimmerman case vigorously opposed the "political question" conclusion, yet
did not cite Colegrove, much less attack the majority's interpretation of it.
18 Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 43 So.2d 514, 517 (La. App., 1949).
"' Latting v. Cordell, 197 Okla. 369,382-83, 172 P.2d 397,409-10 (1946).
140 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), a case similar to Colegrove in terms of issues and
structure of opinions, involved a refusal by the Kansas Legislature to ratify the proposed Child
Labor Amendment to the federal Constitution. A second vote taken twelve years later resulted
in a tie which was broken in favor of ratification by the vote of the Lieutenant Governor. This
action was brought by the state senators who had voted against ratification to prevent the
issuance of official notice that the state had approved the amendment. Their complaint stated,
inter alia, that the Constitution did not allow a state to pass an amendment after once re-
jecting it.
Justices Hughes, Stone and Reed held that the Court had jurisdiction because the case
involved a Constitutional question affecting the amending powers under Article V, but de-
cided to dismiss the action on political-question grounds. justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter
and Douglas agreed with this result but reasoned that the Court should not grant jurisdiction
on the grounds that there should be no judicial review with respect to the amending powers
in Article V. Two justices in dissent agreed with the conclusion reached in the Hughes opinion
that the Court had jurisdiction but disagreed with its application to the particular facts since
they did not believe a political question was involved. They would have decided on the merits
in favor of the mandamus on the grounds that a reasonable time had elapsed for the state to
adopt the amendment and that it had therefore expired. Thus one majority-the dissenters
and the Hughes group-agreed that the Court had jurisdiction but disagreed on the political-
question issue, while a different majority of the Court combined to reach the final result.
Courts at all levels have made little use of this case except as general reference, particularly
to the point of refusal of the judiciary to entertain political questions. Only one attempt has
been made to interpretColeman and this proved to be a failure.The citing judge miscounted and
stated that the Supreme Court "was equally divided upon the question of whether a justiciable
issue or a question political in its nature, and hence not justiciable, was presented." The judge
concluded that "[it is difficult to ascertain in ... Coleman... what really did happen for
the Court had jurisdiction ... ." Latting v. Cordell, 197 Okla. 369, 383, 172 P.2d 397, 410
(1946) (dissent). Finally, it has been noted that the Court has shown considerable finesse in
maintaining its jurisdiction for future purposes. 122 A.L.R. 695, 727 (1939).
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In summary, the "dual majority" cases have not been cited in a consistent
pattern by later courts. Although it can be argued that it would be reasonable
to use them for the view stated in their minority and dissenting opinions, this
has been done in relatively few instances. Instead, they are sometimes used for
their general result, occasionally for their plurality opinion and many times as
having no authority. Finally, note the close relation the "dual majority" cases
bear to the "coordinate opinion" cases containing plurality and minority opin-
ion. They are analytically identical, except insofar as the minority in the former
are supported in their rationale by the dissent.
III
RELATIVE DIsPARITY
The accepted theory as to the precedent value of no-clear-majority decisions
-that they stand only for their general result-is substantiated only to a limit-
ed extent by the cases thus far considered. Those to be discussed in the remain-
der of this comment, the "relative disparity" cases, have been cited primarily
for their plurality opinions and not for their general results.
Broadly speaking, the "relative disparity" cases are characterized by an
inequality of scope'4' between concurrences. Furthermore, the prevailing justices
have split into unequal numerical alignments. These cases may be divided into
five main subgroups, each containing plurality opinions: (1) minority concur-
rence without opinion; (2) technical minority opinion; (3) narrow minority
opinion; (4) broad minority opinion; and (5) second choice minority opinion.
As will be seen, this classification is dictated by the nature of the minority con-
currence and its relation to the plurality opinion.
A. Silent Concurrence
The first subgroup of cases cited primarily for their plurality opinions are
those in which the minority concurs without opinion. It will be convenient to
divide these cases further into two types, depending on the presence or absence
of a dissenting opinion.
There are two decisions of the first type--Hubbert v. Cambellsville Lumber
Co. 42 and Jacob v. New York City.'41 In each the Court split 4-2-(3), with only the
plurality delivering an opinion. In these circumstances, citation of the plurality
opinion as the holding of the case may perhaps be expected, 'due to the'close
resemblance it bears to an "opinion of the Court" and the absence of a con-
flicting rationale.
The Hubbert case involved the issuance of county bonds under one or both
of two statutes. One of the statutes provided special remedies upon default if
certain special terms were marked on the face of the bonds. An attempt was
I4 "Inequality of scope" is used to denote differences between concurrences which, for the
purposes of this comment, are deemed significant. In general, these differences will depend on
whether or not the minority concurrence is "silent" (Section III A), "technical" (Section
III B), "narrow" (Section III C), "broad" (Section I D) or "second choice" (Section
III E).
M 191 U.S. 70 (1903). 143 15 U.S. 752 (1942).
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made to resort to a special remedy with bonds which did not contain the mark-
ing on the ground that the marking requirement was merely directory and not
mandatory. Justices Brewer, Fuller, Holmes and Day asserted that since the
proposed remedies were extraordinary, a reasonable presumption existed that
the marking requirement was mandatory. Justices White and Mc:Kenna con-
curred without opinion. Justices Harlan, Brown and Peckham dissented without
opinion.
Hubbert, despite its antiquity, has been cited only five times.144 All of these
citations were to the plurality opinion, and the split was not mentioned. Nor
was it noted that the plurality opinion represented only a minority of four
justices.
The Jacob case involved an action under the Jones Act 145 brought by an
employee for personal injury damages resulting from the use of a faulty wrench
aboard the employer-defendant's ship. The lower court had directed a verdict
for defendant. Justices Murphy, Black, Douglas and Byrnes reversed, stating
that the plaintiff had a right to a jury trial because he had introduced sufficient
evidence to bring the question of the employer's negligence to the jury. It is
further stated that the defense of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk are not available in actions under the Jones Act. Also, the opinion "sug-
gests" that the simple tool doctrine is not applicable under the Jones Act but
determined that "even assuming its applicability, the doctrine does not justify
removing this case from the jury"'14 since the plaintiff here had inspected the
tool in question, reported defects, and the question still remained whether or
not the employer was negligent in failing to replace it. Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson concurred in the result without opinion. Justices Stone, Roberts and
Reed dissented without opinion.
Jacob has been cited frequently, but on no occasion has the citing court ex-
pressly recognized the split. Some appear to have viewed the Murphy opinion
as the holding of the Court.147 Others have used the Murphy reasoning without
stating it to be the holding.148 A few have cited the general result.1
49
144Walter v. Pennington, 25 F.2d 904, 905 (W.D. Pa., 1928); Graham v. Quinlan, 207
Fed. 268, 272 (C.A. 6th, 1913); Tucker v. Hubbert, 196 Fed. 849, 852 (C.A. 6th, 1912);
Fournacre v. White, 7 Boy. (Del.) 25,45, 102 Ati. 186,194 (1917); Wood v. Gillespie, 169 Miss.
790, 811, 142 So. 747, 755 (1932).
4541 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1936).
l4 Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 757 (1942).
147 Sanford v. Caswell, 200 F.2d 830, 832 (C.A. 5th, 1953); Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d
834, 837 (C.A. 1st, 1951); Sanderson v. Sause Bros., 114 F.Supp. 849, 852 (D. Ore., 1953);
Felin v. Grace Line Co., 97 F.Supp. 441, 442 (S.D.N.Y., 1951); Pitt v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
66 F.Supp. 443, 446 (E.D. Pa., 1946).
14SBenton v. United Towing Co., 120 F.Supp. 638, 640 (N.D. Cal., 1954); Ruberry v.
United States, 93 F.Supp. 683, 685 (D. Mass., 1950); Brislin v. United States, 165 F.2d 296,
297 (C.A. 4th, 1947); Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Stanton, 31 A.2d 680,682 (Mun. App. D.C.,
1942); Olsen v. Kern Temple, 77 N.D. 365, 382, 43 N.W.2d 385, 395 (1950).
31 Pollard v. Seas Shipping Co., 146 F. 2d 875, 877 (C.A. 2d, 1945); Iloisington v. United
States, 127 F.2d 476, 478 (C.A. 2d, 1942); Bascho v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 N.J.Super. 86,
94, 65 A.2d 613, 616 (1949).
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Subsequent courts, when considering decisions like Hubbert and Jacob, have
only one opinion from which to derive a holding. This opinion may often ap-
pear, at least superficially, to be that of a majority of the Court. Under these
circumstances, a case can only be cited for its general result or for the reason-
ing in the sole opinion.150 It is not surprising then that the one written opinion
obtains the force of a holding. The silent concurrences and dissents seem to be
disregarded by subsequent courts.
The second type of "silent concurrence" decision is that in which the dissent
renders an opinion. Thus, there are two opinions-the plurality and the dissent
-and a minority concurrence without opinion. And, since the plurality looks
very much like an "opinion of the Court," or perhaps because there is no com-
peting concurrence, decisions of this type are normally cited for their plurality
opinion when used as precedent. There are six such cases, all except one involv-
ing 4-1-(4) splits: Muhiker v. New York and Harlem Railroad Co.,"' McDonald
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,'51 Gayes v. New York,"' Cox v. United
States,15 4 Trono v. United States55 and Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone.'
The Muhlker case involved an injunction to prevent the defendant railroad
from building an elevated railroad over the street adjacent to plaintiff's proper-
ty unless compensation was given for loss of light and air. Plaintiff's predecessors
had deeded to the city the land under the street for street purposes only. After
plaintiff had purchased his property, the state courts had changed their inter-
pretation of the law with respect to the property rights of land adjacent to
streets. It was claimed that this change impaired the plaintiff's contract
with the government and that it cancelled his property rights without due
process of law.
Justices McKenna, Harlan, Brewer and Day concluded that the plaintiff was
entitled to compensation for the lost light and air, stating that "[the Contract
clause] is the ground of our decision. We are not called upon to discuss the
limitations upon the power of the courts of New York to declare rules of proper-
ty or changes or modify their decisions, but only to decide that such power
cannot be exercised to take away rights which have been acquired by contract
and have come under the protection of the Constitution of the United States.'1 7
Justice Brown concurred in the result but stated no opinion. Justices Holmes,
Fuller, White and Peckham dissented, stating that the Constitution was not
violated by the facts of this case. Rather, the resolution of the property law
therein involved was properly a function of the state courts.
150 The Court has cited Jacob six times, all in general language. Five of the citations were
made by Justice Black, who concurred in the Murphy opinion, and the sixth was made by
Justice Murphy himself.
151 197 U.S. 544 (1905). 154 332 U.S. 442 (1947).
'52323 U.S. 57 (1944). 151199 U.S. 521 (1905).
"'3 332 U.S. 145 (1947). 156 335 U.S. 80 (1947).
151 Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 570 (1905).
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Muklker has been cited a great deal. Only one case, however, has specifically
acknowledged the presence of a silent concurrence. 5 ' Rather, almost half the
cases using Muhiker as precedent expressly indicate that the plurality opinion
was the holding of the Court and do not recognize that it did not represent
the views of a clear majority of justices sitting.159 The rest6 0 use Mishiker for its
result, without elaborating as to the rationale.'
I's State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 517, 126 N.W. 454, 455 (1910).
159 Curiell v. White, 54 F.2d 255, 258 (C.A. 2d, 1931); Farley v. Carey Show Print Co.,
249 Fed. 476, 477 (C.A. 2d, 1918); Roman Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 207
Fed. 897, 906 (C.A. 3d, 1913); Thayer v. Boston, 206 Fed. 969, 973 (D. Mass., 1913); Sauer v.
New York, 206 U.S. 536, 549 (1907); Lentell v. Boston W. S. R. Co., 202 Mass. 115, 120,
88 N.E. 765, 768 (1909); Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. State, 97 Miss. 571, 599, 54 So. 247, 250
(1911); Moore v. Splitdorf Electric Co., 114 N.J.Eq. 358, 364, 168 Atl. 741, 744 (1933);
Linquiti v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 137 N.Y.S.2d. 52,53 (S. Ct., 1955); Matter
of McCoy v. Apgar, 241 N.Y. 71, 79, 148 N.E. 793, 795 (1925); Dauchey Co. v. Farney, 105
Misc. 470, 479, 173 N.Y.Supp. 530, 535 (S. Ct., 1918); Morris v. Henry, 221 N.Y. 96, 98, 116
N.E. 797 (1917); Ogden v. New York, 141 App.Div. 578, 580, 126 N.Y.Supp. 189, 196 (1st
Dep't, 1910); Foster v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R. Co., 118 App.Div. 143, 146, 103 N.Y.Supp. 531,
534 (1st Dep't, 1907); Lawton v. New Rochelle, 51 Misc. 184, 188, 100 N.Y.Supp. 771, 773
(S. Ct., 1906); People ex rel. Loughran v. Flynn, 110 App.Div. 279, 291, 96 N.Y.Supp. 655,
663 (1st Dep't, 1905); Bennett v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry. Co., 170 N.C. 389, 393,
87 S.E. 133, 136 (1915); Adams v. Thurmond, 48 Okla. 189, 194, 149 Pac. 1141, 1143 (1915);
Cook v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah 58, 64, 157 Pac. 643, 646 (1916). Two law review articles also
discussed the iuhlker case extensively without even noting the silent concurrence. The
McKenna opinion was referred to as the holding of the Court. Larremore, Stare Decisis and
Contractual Rights, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 182 (1909); Freeman, The Protections Afforded Against
the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision, 18 Col. L. Rev. 230, 237 (1918).
160 Roberts v. New York City, 295 U.S. 264, 279 (1935); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263
U.S. 444, 452 (1924); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 163 (1913); Sebastian Bridge Dist. v.
Missouri Pac. R. Co., 292 Fed. 345, 350 (C.A. 8th, 1923); Duane v. Merchants Legal Stamp
Co., 231 Mass. 113,125,120 N.E. 370,375 (1918); Vanton Corp. v. N. Y. Rapid Transit Corp.,
252 App.Div. 797, 798, 299 N.Y.Supp. 112, 113 (2d Dep't, 1937); Buffalo Co-op Stove Co. v.
State, 252 App.Div. 228, 231, 298 N.Y.Supp. 731, 735 (4th Dep't, 1937); Perlmetter v.
Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 330, 182 N.E. 5, 6 (1932); In re 42nd Street Spur, 126 Misc. 879, 900,
216 N.Y.Supp. 2 (S. Ct., 1926); Sinsheimer v. Underpinning & Foundation Co., 178 App.Div.
495, 505, 165 N.Y.Supp. 645, 652 (1st Dep't, 1917); Champlain Stone & Sand Co. v. State,
66 Misc. 434, 467, 123 N.Y.Supp. 546, 568 (Ct. Cl., 1910); Fulton L. H & P. Co. v. State, 65
Misc. 263, 289, 121 N.Y.Supp. 536, 553 (Ct. Cl., 1909); People v. Transit Develop. Co., 131
App.Div. 174, 176, 115 N.Y.Supp. 297, 299 (2d Dep't, 1909); Anderson v. N. Y. C. & H. R.
Co., 58 Misc. 72, 74, 110 N.Y.Supp. 232, 233 (S. Ct., 1908); Lawton v. New Rochelle, 123
App.Div. 832, 834, 108 N.Y.Supp. 583, 584 (2d Dep't, 1908); Potter v. Interborough R. T.
Co., 54 Misc. 423, 430, 105 N.Y.Supp. 1071, 1075 (S. Ct., 1907); Leffmann v. Long Island Ry.
Co., 120 App.Div. 529, 105 N.Y.Supp. 487, 488 (2d Dep't, 1907); Leffmann v. Long Island
Ry. Co., 47 Misc. 169, 170, 93 N.Y.Supp. 647, 648 (S. Ct., 1905); Bennett v. Long Island R.
Co., 181 N.Y. 431, 437, 74 N.E. 418, 420 (1905); Foster Lumber Co. v. Arkansas V. & W. R.
Co., 20 Okla. 583, 603, 100 Pac. 1110, 1113 (1908); Sandstrom v. Oregon Washington Ry. &
Navigation Co. 75 Ore. 159, 162, 146 Pac. 803, 804 (1905).
161 This fact is particularly interesting because the McKenna opinion used a constitutional
rationale. This means that, although five sitting justices did not record agreement with the
McKenna analysis of the Contract and Due Process clauses, this fact went essentially un-
explored for over fifty years. During this time eighteen cases, including one by the Supreme
Court (Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536 [1907] [which distinguished Muhlker]), have been
directly affected by the Muhlker-minority analysis. This result seems difficult to defend
unless there is some basis for linking a concurrence without opinion with a four-justice "opinion
of the Court."
19561 COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
McDonald v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue was concerned with whether
campaign expenses of a political candidate, and assessments upon candidates
exacted by their political party, were permissible deductions for income tax
purposes. The relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 were Sec-
tion 23 (a) (I) (A) ("business or trade expenses"); Section 23 (e) (2) ("transactions
entered into for profit"); and Section 121 ("expenses for production of income").
Justices Frankfurter, Stone, Roberts and Jackson concluded that these statu-
tory provisions did not allow campaign expense deductions, and, even if the
statutes were less clear, "we should not be inclined to displace the views of the
Tax Court with our own. '162 justice Rutledge concurred in the result without
opinion. Justices Black, Reed, Douglas and Murphy dissented. They felt that,
at least in part, campaign expenses should be included under Section 121 as
expenses "for the production of income." And, since the Tax Court had made
no findings of fact but had instead categorically denied campaign expenses,
they would remand to the Tax Court to pass on the particular facts at hand.
Thus, four justices would have denied all income tax deductions for cam-
paign expenses, and four would have determined on the facts of the particular
case whether such expenses were for "the production of income." One justice
agreed with the refusal of the deduction in this case but expressed no opinion
on the statutory interpretation.
No case citing McDonald has specifically noted the absence of a clear-majori-
ty opinion. In most instances, reference is made directly or indirectly only to
the Frankfurter opinion. Some refer to this opinion as the holding.163 The case
has been cited in general terms"' and for secondary points.16 The silent single-
justice minority apparently did not detract from the weight of the plurality,
despite the presence of a four-justice dissent.'
In Gayes v. New York, a defendant in a burglary prosecution was convicted
without counsel, and was later convicted of another crime. His second sentence
was increased because of the first conviction. justices Frankfurter, Vinson, Reed
and Jackson held that in a third proceeding the second sentence could not be
challenged for lack of counsel at the first trial, "so far as the United States
Constitution is concerned." Instead, the proper remedy would have been to
162 McDonald v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 323 U.S. 57, 64 (1944).
163 E.g., in Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401, 402 (C.A. 4th, 1953), the court said that in
McDonald "the Supreme Court has expressly decided that campaign expenses are not de-
ductible from income."
164 Robertson v. Steele's Mills, 172 F.2d 817, 819 (C.A. 4th, 1949).
165 In Commissioner v. George Jones Co., 152 F.2d 358, 361 (C.A. 6th, 1945), the case was
used to support the rationale of restricting Supreme Court review of tax cases to results which
have no "warrant in the record and... [no] reasonable basis in the law" (taken from Frank-
furter opinion). Accord: Lincoln Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 379 (C.A. 6th, 1947).
11 Subsequent courts may have been influenced in accepting the Frankfurter opinion
and ignoring Rutledge's silence by the fact that the Frankfurter opinion seems to be in accord
with prior law. Cf., Higgins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
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attack the first conviction during the second sentencing. Justice Burton
merely concurred in the result and expressed no opinion. Justices Rutledge,
Black, Douglas and Murphy dissented, stating that the constitutional violation
was clear and, furthermore, that under New York law "the so called 'flank'
attack is apparently the only one now open to petitioner."'6 7 It was further
stated that it was up to the state to determine which method may be utilized
later to attack criminal proceedings.6 8
Gayes has been cited rather frequently. In several instances, the split on the
Court has been noted,169 although the predominant use has been that of citing
the plurality opinion as the holding. 70 Analyses of Gayes worthy of note have
appeared in decisions rendered by the Bronx County Court'71 and the Wyoming
County Court,17 2 both in New York. The Wyoming County case involved a
fourth offender, one of whose convictions had been in a foreign jurisdiction
where the New York criminal standards were held not to be in effect. His con-
viction as a fourth offender was therefore found invalid. In distinguishing Gayes,
the court noted that the Frankfurter opinion and the dissent each received the
votes of four justices and that Burton concurred only in the result. Thus, "[t]here
is nothing to indicate that ... Burton disagreed with the law as heretofore
announced by the New York courts.'' Consequently, the Wyoming court did
not follow the Gayes decision.
The Bronx County Court criticized Gayes as "creating doubt as to what due
process is today... [and is of] grave consequence if controlling and appli-
cable."' 74 Because Justice Burton concurred in result only, the court refused to
give Gayes any consideration. It thus allowed a convicted fourth offender to
167 Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145, 154 (1947). In a footnote Justice Rutledge stated
that, under the New York case law, it would be necessary for petitioner to vacate the first
sentence before he could attack the second. Ibid., at 152 n. 11.
106 The Supreme Court has cited Gayes only three times, never authoritatively. United
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954); Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660, 661 (1950);
Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 141 (1946).
169 People v. McAllister, 194 Misc. 674, 679, 87 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647 (Bronx County Ct.,
1949); People ex rel. Marlowe v. Martin, 192 Misc. 192, 196,83 N.Y.S.2d 201,205 (Wyoming
County Ct., 1948); People v. Gayes, 190 Misc. 865,77 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Schenectady County Ct.,
1948) (on remand from Supreme Court).
170 United States ex rel. Turpin v. Snyder, 183 F.2d 742, 743 (C.A. 2d, 1950); United States
v. Rockower, 171 F.2d 423, 425 (C.A. 2d, 1948); United States v. Kline, 98 F.Supp. 325,
328 (E.D.N.Y., 1951); State ex rel. Watkins v. Murray, 228 Ind. 277, 91 N.E.2d 845 (1950);
United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102, 105 (C.A. 7th, 1948).
'I' People v. McAllister, 194 Misc. 674, 87 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Bronx County Ct., 1949).
172 People ex rel. Marlow v. Martin, 192 Misc. 192,83 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Wyoming County Ct.,
1948).
173 Ibid., at 196 and 206.
17 People v. McAllister, 194 Misc. 674, 679, 87 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647 (Bronx County Ct.,
1949).
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attack his third conviction on a claim of deprivation of counsel.175 Other cases
in New York, however, have cited the Frankfurter opinion as the Gayes
holding. 78
Cox v. United States involved a review of defendants' convictions for being
AWOL from a conscientious objector's camp. The defense was that the de-
fendants should be exempt from such service because they were ministers as
defined by the Selective Service Act. 7 7 They previously had exhausted their
administrative remedies in an attempt to obtain this exemption.
Justices Reed, Vinson, Jackson and Burton stated that the defendants had
a right to raise the issue of their classification in these proceedings. However,
they would limit the appeal to the question of whether there was any "basis in
fact" for the Selective Service Board's decision. They decided that under the
facts of this case the decision of the board, which refused to classify defendants
as ministers, should stand. They noticed particularly that defendants had been
engaged in secular employment as well as performing religious duties, and em-
phasized the relatively small number of hours spent in the service of the religious
organization. Justice Frankfurter concurred in this result but stated no opinion.
Justices Douglas and Black, dissenting, agreed with the Reed opinion that the
scope of review was limited to the "basis of fact" point but disagreed on the
interpretation of the instant facts. They rejected the part of the Reed analysis
which had discussed the number of hours defendants acted as "ministers" and
also that part which would give weight to the evidence that defendants had
secular employment concurrently with their "ministerial" duties. They would
disregard such criteria. In a separate dissent, Justices Murphy and Rutledge
objected to the application of the "basis in fact" rule. They noted that the de-
fendants were raising the issue in a criminal action where the "stakes are too
high... to permit an inappreciable amount of supporting evidence to sanction
a draft board classification." 75 Instead, they would expand the scope of judicial
review. "[O]nly evidence of a substantial nature warrants approval of the draft
board classification in a criminal proceeding."'7 9 They agreed with the Douglas
175 The only other reference to the disagreement in Gayes was in a dissent which maintained
that the state had relied on Gayes as holding (as the Frankfurter opinion had stated) that the
Sixth Amendment did not apply to the states. The dissent maintained that "it is important
to note that the opinion in the Gayes case was actually the opinion of but four of the ma-
jority... 2" Bojinoff v. State, 274 App.Div. 838, 839, 80 N.Y.S.2d 513, 515 (4th Dep't,
1948). This is an interesting example of the use of the lack of a clear majority to weaken the
precedent value of the case. The same proposition-that the Sixth Amendment does not
apply to the states-was decided by a clear majority in Foster v. fllinois, 332 U.S. 502 (1946),
which was handed down on the same day as Gayes.
76 People v. Rutherford, 275 App.Div. 780, 87 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d Dep't, 1949); People
v. Huber, 194 Misc. 586, 588, 87 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242 (S. Ct., 1949); People v. Catanzaro, 77
N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (Kings County Ct., 1948).
7754 Stat. 885 (1940), 57 Stat. 596 (1943), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§301-18 (1951).
178 Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 458 (1947).
179 Ibid., at 458.
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opinion that the fact that the defendants did not spend full time as ministers
and that they also engaged in secular employment afforded "no reasonable
basis for implying a non-ministerial status."'80
Thus, six justices agreed that the "basis in fact" rule should be applied, but
only four agreed that working part time as a minister, coupled with a non-
ministerial secular job, was a sufficient basis in fact to support the denial of
ministerial classification by a Selective Service Board. An equally strong
minority of four justices rejected these factors as a reasonable basis in fact, two
of these refusing to accept the "basis in fact" rule at all. Frankfurter expressed
no opinion.
Few citations to Cox have recognized its no-clear-majority aspect. Instead,
most later cases refer only to the six-justice agreement on the "basis in fact"
rule.'8' Nevertheless, several cases have cited the Reed opinion as to whether
or not the facts in Cox presented a sufficient basis to justify reversal."8 2 Thus,
citation of the plurality opinion appears again to be the general rule.'83
In Trono v. U.S., the defendants had been indicted for murder and con-
victed of assault, a lesser crime. They then appealed to the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands which reversed the assault conviction, found them guilty
of the higher crime of homicide and sentenced them accordingly. The appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States was based on the claim that this action
constituted double jeopardy under an act of Congress'8 4 applicable to the
Philippine Islands which contained language substantially identical to the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution of the United States.
Justices Peckham, Brewer, Brown and Day asserted that, because the origi-
nal appeal was by the defendants, it resulted in a waiver of the entire original
judgment and a conviction of a higher crime upon the appeal was not double
jeopardy. Justice Holmes concurred in the result without opinion. Justice Har-
lan dissented on the ground that the Philippine Islands are within the jurisdic-
tion of the Constitution and that, since there had been no jury or grand jury,
the prosecution of the case was unconstitutional. Justices McKenna and White
dissented on the ground that, even though the defendants had appealed, the
reversal by the Philippine Supreme Court on these facts constituted double
jeopardy and was therefore a violation of the statute. Chief Justice Fuller dis-
sented without opinion.
80 Ibid., at 459.
"I The case has been cited thirty-six times for this rule. Since a majority agreed on this
point these cases are not enumerated herein.
182 United States v. Bartelt, 200 F.2d 385, 387 (C.A. 7th, 1952); Jeffries v. United States,
169 F.2d 86, 89 (C.A. 10th, 1948); United States v. Koch, 119 F.Supp. 650, 652 (D. Neb.,
1954).
183 The Reed plurality opinion may have been more easily accepted by subsequent courts
as that of the Court because of the split among the dissenters, even though they were in
agreement on the question of secular employment and number of hours spent in the ministry.
1894 32 Stat. 691 (1902).
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In general, the Trono plurality opinion has been cited as the holding of the
Court185 without mention of the silent concurrence. 6 The Mississippi Court,
although perhaps more forcefully than most courts, typifies this in its statement
that: "In the case of Trono ... we find the rule clearly and forcibly stated
through Justice Peckham... from the highest judicial authority of the country
and as such is entitled to great respect." " Other courts refer only to the result
in Trono, without reference to its rationale. 8
In Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, the Court upheld, in a 3-1-1-(4) split,
a Mississippi "doing business" tax on "capital used, invested or employed with-
in the state" as applied to local portions of an interstate pipeline. The company
engaged in no intrastate commerce in Mississippi.
Justices Reed, Douglas and Murphy concluded that the tax was valid since
it was based on the local activity of maintenance of the pipeline-protected by
the state "apart from the flow of commerce." They noted that the tax was not
an apportioned tax on gross receipts from interstate commerce itself. The fact
185 Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373, 374 (1955) (opinion of Douglas, J.); Bryan v.
United States, 338 U.S. 552, 560 (1950); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919);
Miller v. United States, 224 F.2d 561, 562 (C.A. 5th, 1955); Bryan v. United States, 175
F.2d 223, 229 (C.A. 5th, 1949); Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F.2d 592, 593 (C.A. 5th, 1947);
United States v. Bozza, 155 F.2d 592, 595 (C.A. 3d, 1946); Bayless v. United States, 147
F.2d 169, 170 (C.A. 8th, 1945); Carbonell v. People of Porto Rico, 27 F.2d 253 (C.A. 1st,
1928); Henry v. Hodges, 76 F.Supp. 968, 972 (S.D.N.Y., 1948); United States v. Gonzales,
206 Fed. 239 (W.D. Wash., 1913); Young v. People, 54 Colo. 293, 306, 130 Pac. 1011, 1016
(1913); Frank v. State, 142 Ga. 741, 750, 83 S.E. 645, 649 (1914); Yeates v. Roberson, 4 Ga.
App. 573, 577, 62 S.E. 104, 106 (1908); People v. Pleitt, 308 Ill. 323, 325, 139 N.E. 597, 598
(1923); State v. Huff, 217 Iowa 41, 47, 250 N.W. 581, 583 (1933); Van Scoy v. Gretten, 177
Iowa 431, 436, 158 N.W. 510, 512 (1916); People v. Peck, 147 Mich. 84,87, 110 N.W. 495
(1907); People v. Farrell, 146 Mich. 264, 274, 109 N.W. 440, 442 (1906); Jones v. State, 144
Miss. 52, 64, 109 So. 265, 267 (1926); Calicoat v. State, 131 Miss. 169, 196-97, 95 So. 318,
320 (1922); State v. Austin, 318 Mo. 859, 864, 300 S.W. 1083, 1085 (1927); In re Somers, 31
Nev. 531, 533, 103 Pac. 1073, 1075 (1909); State v. Lamoreaux, 20 N.J.Super. 65, 74, 89 A.2d
469,474 (1952); People v. McGrath, 202 N.Y. 445, 451, 96 N.E. 92, 94 (1911); State v. Chase,
231 N.C. 589, 592, 58 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1950); State v. Davis, 175 N.C. 723, 730, 95 S.E. 48,
51 (1918); State v. Matthews, 142 N.C. 621, 622, 55 S.E. 342 (1906); State v. Gillis, 73 S.C.
318, 324, 53 S.E. 487, 489 (1906); State v. B-., 173 Wis. 608, 622, 182 N.W. 474, 479 (1921).
186 Justice Frankfurter, the only jurist who has commented upon the discord on the Trono
Court, did not mention the lack of a majority. In Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 428
(1953), he said: "The conflicting views expressed in... Trono... indicate the subtle tech-
nical controversies to which the provisions of the Fifth Amendment against double jeopardy
has given rise." In two other instances it was intimated that the Peckham opinion did not
command a majority of justices. The Georgia Supreme Court described the rationale as having
been said "in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Peckham." Brantley v. State, 132 Ga. 573,
577, 64 S.E. 676, 678 (1909). The Georgia Court did not explicitly state that no majority was
in agreement in Trono. See United States v. Harriman, 130 F.Supp. 198, 204 (S.D.N.Y.,
1955).
1817 Calicoat v. State, 131 Miss. 169, 197-200, 95 So. 318, 325-26 (1922).
188 Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 102 (1914); District of Columbia v. Huffman,
42 A.2d 502, 504 (Mun. App. D.C., 1945); Pendleton v. United States, 216 U.S. 305, 311
(1910); Flemister v. United States, 207 U.S. 372, 374 (1907); Pierce v. State, 96 Okla. Cr.
76, 79,248 P.2d 633, 637 (1952).
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that interstate commerce could not be conducted without these local activities
did not make the tax one on the privilege of doing interstate business. Justice
Rutledge concurred in a separate opinion. He disagreed with the Reed opinion,
stating that "the local activities ... [are not] separate from the interstate busi-
ness. . either by reason of the apportionment or otherwise."' 8 9 Rather, in
certain instances, as here, the local portions of interstate commerce can be
taxed by a state. Justice Black concurred without opinion. Justices Frankfurter,
Vinson, Jackson and Burton dissented, stating that the Memphis Co. received
no protection from the state and that the tax was not on any "local incidents"
which have not already been fully taxed. They concluded that the tax was one
on the privilege of doing interstate business within the state, could not be
justified as an additional ad valorem tax, and was therefore invalid.
It should be noted that the structure of the opinions in Memphis differs from
that of the typical "silent concurrence" case. Instead of only one written con-
curring opinion, Memphis has two. Nevertheless, the silent concurrence is deter-
minative of the result, since less than a clear majority of justices support the
written concurrences. A further question is presented by the relationship of the
two concurring opinions. It may be argued that since Rutledge saw no difficulty
in taxing the concomitants of interstate commerce, he certainly would find no
problem with respect to local incidents apart from such commerce. Thus,
Rutledge would appear to agree with the Reed opinion, except insofar as he was
willing to go even further. 9 ' Under this analysis, four justices would accept the
plurality view (with one going even further). In this sense Memphis closely
approaches the typical "silent concurrence" case.
Memphis has been used as precedent almost exclusively for the view taken by
its plurality (Reed) opinion,191 although the Rutledge opinion has been cited.19
This pattern has developed notwithstanding the fact that Justice Reed, speak-
139 Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 98 (1947).
190 This phenomenon is characteristic of the "broad minority" cases discussed in Part
M D infra. Several other cases involved in this comment also present an overlapping between
the distinctive factors of different "relative disparity" subgroups. Consult Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137 (1953), discussed in note 239 infra and Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601
(1949), discussed in Part Mll E infra. In these circumstances, classification depends on which
element is deemed analytically dispositive of the particular case.
'91 Gadsden v. Roadway Express, 73 So.2d 765, 770 (Ala. App., 1954); Martin Ship Service
Co. v. Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 793, 803, 215 P.2d 24,30 (1950); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v.
Hoffman, 4 Ill.2d 468, 476, 123 N.E.2d 503, 507 (1954); Coleman v. Trunkline Gas Co., 61
So.2d 276, 283 (Miss., 1952); Reichman-Crosby Co. v. Stone, 204 Miss. 122, 154, 37 So.2d
22, 27 (1948); Great Lakes Pipeline Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 204 Okla. 518, 522, 231 P.2d
655, 658 (1951); Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v. Messner, 377 Pa. 234, 242, 103 A.2d 700, 704
(1954); Calvert v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 255 S.W.2d 535, 544 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1953); Commonwealth v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 193 Va. 55, 65, 68, 68 S.E.2d 137, 144
(1951). Accord: Mitchell Publishing Co. v. Wilder, 74 S.D. 343, 349, 52 N.W.2d 732, 735
(1952) (dissent).
'
92Southwestern Gas & Electric Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 208 Okla. 85, 89, 253 P.2d
549, 553 (1953); cf. Coleman v. Trunkline Gas Co., 218 Miss. 285, 294, 63 So.2d 73, 76 (1953).
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ing for four justices in the Interstate case and unopposed on this question by the
remaining five, stated that Memphis was "indecisive."' 93 Similarly, the only
other citing Court taking this view of Memphis concluded that "[I]n view of the
divisions within the [Memphis] Court, there is [no] majority opinion which can
be relied upon as giving the rationale of the Court's decision." 94
In summary, the "silent concurrence" decisions do not appear to substantiate
the theory that no-clear-majority decisions have precedent value only for their
general result. Instead, they have to a large degree presented a pattern of cita-
tion for their plurality opinions. This is clearly true in the absence of a dissent-
ing opinion, and almost as certain where one is present. The resemblance borne
by the typical four-justice plurality opinion and the absence of competing con-
curring opinions afford a possible basis for the explanation of this citation
pattern.
B. Technical Minority
The presence of a silent concurrence is not the determinative factor in all
no-clear-majority decisions where the plurality opinion is given stare decisis
value. Another subgroup of cases, containing written minority concurrences, is
similarly (although to a lesser extent) cited for its plurality opinions. In these
cases the minority opinion is usually supported by only one justice and is con-
fined to a somewhat technical ground, with the stronger rule or problem dis-
cussed by the plurality being specifically rejected or not considered.
These "technical minority" cases are distinguishable from the "coordinate
opinion" cases discussed above. There, the minority not only expressed refusal
to join the rationale of the plurality, but also proposed an equally strong and
distinct rule. Here, no strong second rule is present, except perhaps in the dis-
sent. Three cases will be discussed in this subgroup: United States v. Williams,x91
Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Leatherwood95 and Wheeler v. Sohmer. 97
The Williams case involved several persons who, it was alleged, acting under
the color of state law had conspired to obtain forced confessions in violation of
a federal statute.'98 All but one of the defendants had previously been acquitted
of the substantive offense under a related statute199 before the conspiracy in-
193 Interstate Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 676 (1949).
194 Spector Motor Service v. O'Conner, 181 F.2d 150, 155 (C.A. 2d, 1950).
193 41 U.S. 70 (1951).
196 250 U.S. 478 (1919).
197 233 U.S. 434 (1914).
198 62 Stat. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. §241 (1951). "If two or more persons conspire to injure,
oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States," they shall be in
violation of the statute.
199 62 Stat. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. §242 (1951). "Whoever, under color of any law ...
wilfully subjects any inhabitant of any State ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States" shall be
in violation of the statute.
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dictments were returned. The Supreme Court sustained a reversal by a 4-1-(4)
split.
Justices Frankfurter, Vinson, Jackson and Minton concluded that the con-
spiracy statute in question "applies only to the interference with rights which
arise from the relation of the victim and the Federal Government, and not to
interference by State officers with rights which the Federal Government merely
guarantees from abridgment by the States. ' 20 Justice Black concurred in the
result on the limited ground that the instant prosecution was barred by the
principle of res judicala. He reasoned that since all but one of the defendants
had been declared innocent of the substantive offense, and since no other evi-
dence of the unlawful agreement had been presented, the prior acquittals oper-
ated to bar this action because one person cannot conspire with himself. Justices
Douglas, Reed, Burton and Clark dissented, rejecting the reasoning of both
concurring opinions.
The Williams case has not been cited frequently. When used, the approach
has been to cite the Frankfurter opinion as the "opinion of the Court," dis-
regarding the fact that a majority did not agree with its rationale.2 ' As an
extreme example, one court has stated, with reference to Williams, that "[u]pon
appeal the Supreme Court by a divided court affirmed the dismissal upon the
first ground assigned by the Court of Appeals" 2 2-that the conspiracy statute
was not intended to apply to rights set out in the Fourteenth Amendment. And,
although the court noted that Justice Black had rendered a concurring opinion,
reference was made to the Frankfurter opinion as the "majority opinion" and
as "[what] the Supreme Court... held." 203
Leatherwood presents a similar problem of statutory construction. The ques-
tion was whether the Carmack Amendment, 2 4 which regulated shipments by
rail through connecting carriers, bound the shipper and all subsequent carriers
to the terms of the original bill of lading. The original bill of lading had con-
tained a clause barring any action for damages beyond six months after the loss
occurred. The connecting carriers had insisted that the shipper sign new bills
covering shipment over their lines which did not contain the six month limita-
200 United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1951).
201 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 569 (C.A. 2d, 1953); United States v. Bailes,
120 F.Supp. 614, 621 (S.D. W.Va., 1954); Arkansas v. Central Surety Insurance Co., 102
F.Supp. 444,448 (W.D. Ark., 1952); New Jersey v. Low, 18 N.J. 179, 191, 113 A.2d 169, 175
(1955).
202 United States v. Bailes, 120 F.Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. W.Va., 1954).
203 Ibid. The only specific notation of the split is in Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S.
273, 307 (1953), where Justice Frankfurter cited Williams rhetorically while stating that "[tihe
Reports of this Court are replete with instances of marked division of opinion in construing
criminal statutes." Scarlette v. State, 201 Md. 319, 93 A.2d 757 (1953), cited the res judicata
opinion of Justice Black but emphasized that it was voiced only in a separate concurring
opinion. Several cases have cited Williams generally, but the citations are of no use to this
analysis.
20,34 Stat. 584, 585 (1906).
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tion. The shipper complied. More than six months after the occurrence of loss,
the shipper sued the original carrier and the connecting carriers, repudiating all
bills and claiming upon an implied obligation created by the original carrier
when the goods were accepted for through interstate carriage. The connecting
carriers claimed that the subsequent bills had no legal effect and that the terms
of the original bill were binding on all parties.
Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Day and White concurred, holding that under
the Carmack Amendment, "the bill of lading given by the initial carrier em-
bodies the contract for transportation from point of origin to destination; and
its terms in respect to conditions of liability are binding upon the shipper and
all connecting carriers... [and] has in effect the force of a statute, of which
all affected must take notice.1 2°5 In a separate concurring opinion, Justices
McReynolds and Van Devanter stated that this "broad declaration" was be-
yond the requirements needed for the decision, and that they were "not pre-
pared to assent to it as a proposition of law." 2 Instead, they would deny the
action for damages on the limited factual ground that the shipper had repudi-
ated the subsequent bills. It was intimated that had he relied on them, "the
question presented would have been a very different one. ' 2 7 justices McKenna,
Pitney and Clarke dissented without opinion.
The Court was thus split 4-2-(3), with four justices contending that any
waiver of the terms of the original bill of lading was prohibited, two relying
strictly on the facts of the case and specifically objecting to the broad doctrine
of prohibition of waiver, and three disagreeing with these positions but not
stating their reasons.
Over three-fourths of the many cases using Leatherwood as precedent state
that its plurality opinion was the holding.208 Several are quite emphatic. None
205 Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Leatherwood, 250 U.S. 478, 481 (1919).
206 Ibid., at 482.
207 Ibid.
200 Of sixty-one cases citing Leatherwood, fourteen were discarded for this analysis because
of the general nature of the citation. Of the remaining forty-seven, the following thirty-five
cited the purality opinion as the holding. Notation has been made where the opinion com-
mented on the cited case. Galveston Wharf v. Galveston, H. & S.A.Ry. Co., 285 U.S. 127,
135 (1932); Burns v. Chicago M.St.P. & P.R. Co., 192 F.2d 472, 477 (C.A. 8th, 1951); Penn-
sylvania R. Co. v. Miller, 124 F.2d 160, 163 (C.A. 5th, 1942) (dissent) ("the vigorously estab-
lished rule"); American Ry. Express Co. v. The Fashion Shop, 10 F.2d 909 (App. D.C.,1926)
("In Leatherwood ... the Court said .... "); New York Central R. Co. v. Gardner, 294 Fed.
89, 90 (C.A. 7th, 1923); McGinn v. Oregon-Washington Ry. & Navigation Co., 265 Fed. 81,
84 (C.A. 9th, 1920) ("Such is, in effect the holding of the Supreme Court in... Leatherwood.
. "); Burns v. Chicago M.St.P. & P.R. Co., 100 F.Supp. 405,409 (W.D. Mo., 1951); Norton
v. Shotmeyer, 72 F.Supp. 188, 192 (D.N.J., 1947) "The Supreme Court in Leatherwood ...
has specifically stated.... ."); Inland Waterways Corp. v. Sloss Sheffield Steel & Iron Co.,
223 Ala. 397, 399, 136 So. 849, 851 (1931); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Strickland, 219 Ala. 581,
584, 122 So. 693, 698 (1929); Southern Ry. Co. v. Northwestern Fruit Exch., 210 Ala. 519,
520, 98 So. 382, 384 (1923); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Midstate Horticultural Co., 21 Cal.2d
243, 252, 131 P.2d 544, 549 (1942) ("Ithas been decided.. . "citing "see... Leatherwood");
Cassone v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 100 Conn. 262, 268, 123 Atl. 280, 283 (1924); Ameri-
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recognize that they are relying on a view which did not have clear-majority
support. Most of the remaining cases cite Leatherwood for its general result,2 9
also without acknowledging the lack of a clear majority. In fact, only two cases
have noted the Leatherwood split.210 Thus, Leatherwood has been cited predomi-
nantly for its plurality opinion. The presence of the two-justice minority, as
can Ry. Express Co. v. Roberts, 28 Ga.App. 510, 511, 111 S.E. 744, 745 (1922) ("Under de-
cisions of the Supreme Court ...." citing Leatherwood); Berg v. Schreiber, 337 Ill.App.
477,482,86 N.E.2d 125, 127 (1949) ("clear to us...." citing Leatherwood); Lewis v. Roth, 328
IlI.App. 571, 573, 66 N.E.2d 510, 511 (1946); Bronstein v. Payne, 138 Md. 116, 120, 113 Atl.
648,649 (1921) ("[I]n Leatherwood... the Supreme Court again stated and emphasized the
proposition .... '); Carbic Mfg. Co. v. Western Express Co., 149 Minn. 467,471,184 N.W. 35,
36 (1921) ("the Court said. . . ."); Jordan v. Chicago B. & Q.R. Co., 206 Mo.App. 56,60,226
S.W. 1023, 1025 (1920); Browning-King & Co. v. Davis, 120 Misc. 520, 522, 199 N.Y.Supp.
775, 777 (S. Ct., 1923); Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Armfield Co., 189 N.C. 581, 584, 127 S.E.
557, 559 (1925) ("In Leatherwood it is said.... ."); Rogers & Co. v. East Carolina Ry. Co.,
186 N.C. 86, 88, 118 S.E. 885, 886 (1923) ("In... Leatherood... it was decided .... );
Spartan Mills v. Davis, 126 S.C. 312, 319, 118 S.E. 614, 616 (1923); Allen v. Davis, 125 S.C.
256, 262, 118 S.E. 614, 616 (1923) ("[The Supreme Court of the United States would seem to
be clearly committed to the doctrine.... See Leatherwood .... '); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry.
Co. v. American Grocery Co., 122 Tex. 1, 15, 36 S.W.2d 985, 991 (1931); City National
Bank of El Paso v. N.E.R. Co., 225 S.W. 391, 399 (Tex. Civ. App., 1920) ('Leatherwood...
simply holds that... ."); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. National Fruit Products Co., 155 Va.
438,449,155 S.E. 630,635 (1930); Southern Produce Co. v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 144 Va.
422, 442, 132 S.E. 360, 365 (1926); Davis v. Rodgers, 139 Va. 618, 626, 124 S.E. 408, 410
(1924) ("[T]he Supreme Court in ... Leatherwood ... said.... ."); Pelaggi & Co. v. Central
Vermont Ry. Co., 97 Vt. 1, 6, 121 Atl. 441, 443 (1923) ("The Court held in Leatherwood...
in effect.... ."); Carleton Mining & Power Co. v. West Virginia Northern R. Co., 110 W.Va.
631,639, 159 S.E. 44,48 (1931); Wholesale Coal Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 106 W.Va.
53, 55, 144 S.E. 715, 746 (1928); Western Md. Ry. Co. v. Cross, 96 W.Va. 666, 123 S.E. 572
(1924); Hubbard Grocery Co. v. Payne, 94 W.Va. 273, 276, 118 S.E. 152, 153 (1923); Mosser
Co. v. Payne, 92 W.Va. 41, 48, 114 S.E. 365, 367 (1922) ("there held").
209 Keystone Motor Freight Lines v. Brannon-Signaigo Cigar Co., 115 F.2d 736 (C.A. 5th,
1940); The General W. Goethals, 298 Fed. 935 (C.A. 2d, 1924); Leigh Ellis & Co. v. Payne,
274 Fed. 443 (N.D. Ga., 1921); Humphrey-Cornell Co. v. Hines, 97 Conn. 21, 115 Atl. 561
(1921); Holmes & Dawson v. East Carolina Ry. Co., 186 N.C. 58, 118 S.E. 887 (1923); Thigpen
v. East Carolina Ry. Co., 184 N.C. 33, 113 S.E. 562 (1922); St. Sing v. American Ry. Exp. Co.,
183 N.C. 405, 111 S.E. 710 (1922); Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 277 Pa. 105, 120 AUt. 778
(1923); Terry Packing Co. v. Southern Express Co., 143 S.C. 1, 141 S.E. 144 (1927); Davis
v. Roper Lumber Co., 138 Va. 377, 122 S.E. 113 (1924).
210 Jones & Co. v. Davis, 65 Cal.App. 164, 223 Pac. 560 (1924); Jenckes Spinning Co. v.
New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 47 R.I. 72, 129 Atl. 815 (1925). The latter case applied the broad
rule stated by the Leatherwood plurality opinion and which only three years previously had
been accepted unanimously in Georgia R. Co. v. Blish, 241 U.S. 190 (1916). The Jenckes court
explained the change in the attitude of the Court in Leatherwood (as opposed to Blish) on the
ground of factual differences. Although not articulated in Jenckes, this difference seems to be
primarily that in Leatherwood, unlike Jenckes or Blish, the plaintiff shipper based his claim
on a theory of implied contract with all of the defendant carriers and claimed that all of the
bills of lading were invalid. The two concurring minority justices, and possibly the three who
dissented without opinion, considered that this case could therefore have been decided against
the plaintiff without resort to the broad rule concerning the binding nature of the initial bill of
lading. This would appear to be a sensible disposition of Leatherwood, particularly if the
Jenckes court felt confined by the accepted, but not often followed, notion that all no-clear-
maiority cases have no precedent value.
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contrasted with the single-justice minority in Williams, is perhaps offset by the
absence of a dissenting opinion.
Wheeler v. Sohmer concerned the right of a state to impose a transfer tax on
promissory notes located within the taxing state at the date of the nonresident
owner's death, when the death occurred in another state. The Supreme Court
held 4-2-(3) that the tax was not unconstitutional under the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The split in opinion revolved primarily around
the interpretation of Buck v. Beach,"' where the Court had held that Indiana
could not impose a property tax on notes which had been temporarily placed
within the state in order to avoid a similar Ohio property tax, when the situs
of the debt and domicile of the owner was not in Indiana.
Justices Holmes, Day, Lurton, and Hughes favored a rule which would up-
hold the power of a state to tax notes solely on the basis of their presence in the
taxing jurisdiction. They stated that Buck had seemingly been decided on the
grounds of temporary situs and had also been limited to property taxes. And,
if not, then it must "yield to the current of authorities" 212-those which had
upheld the taxing of notes based on their presence within the jurisdiction. Jus-
tices McKenna and Pitney concurred in result but disagreed with the "situs"
rule. Instead, they based their decision on the ground that ancillary letters of
administration for the notes had been probated in the taxing jurisdiction and
that the right to impose a transfer tax was therefore present. They stated that
Buck did not revolve on the point of temporary transfer but was applicable only
to property taxes and did not extend to inheritance taxes. Justices Lamar,
White and Van Devanter dissented. They agreed with the minority on its inter-
pretation of the "situs" rule and that Buck did not go on the point of temporary
transfer. However, they felt that the Buck doctrine should apply to transfer
taxes as well as to property taxes, and would thus not allow the tax in this case.
The Supreme Court has had occasion to refer to Wheeler several times. Three
cases"' have cited it as authority for the right of the situs state to tax. However
the discussion in all three was confined to general terminology and two qualified
it by such comments as "notes... may acquire a situs at a place other than the
domicile of the owner,"' 1 4 or "we held that the state might tax such notes as
property having a local situs. '" 215 (Italics added.) Such qualifications suggest
that these are citations of the general result rather than of the plurality opinion.
The plurality opinion would appear to have gained some currency as the
holding in Wheeler. Thus, the Court has ruled that double taxation is illegal per
se, without answering Justice Stone, who in arguing that the Court had previ-
211 206 U.S. 392 (1907).
21 Wheeler v. Sohmer, 223 U.S. 434, 440 (1914).
213 Crichton v. Wingfield, 258 U.S. 66 (1932); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
280 U.S. 204 (1930); DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376 (1919).
214 DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376, 382 (1919).
215 Crichton v. Wingfield, 258 U.S. 66, 75 (1922).
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ously been unconcerned with subjecting property to double taxation, stated that
its ruling might be "far reaching enough to overturn... Wheeler. ... "21 The
reference to Wheeler is significant only if Stone was recognizing the plurality
opinion as the holding, since double taxation is a product of the rule-in
Wheeler espoused only by the plurality opinion-that the state of situs may tax
property solely because of its physical presence therein. Shortly thereafter, the
double-taxation rule was applied to a case 17 similar to Wheeler and the Court
held that the situs state could not constitutionally impose an inheritance tax
on bank deposits when the state of residence had also imposed a similar tax
on the same deposits of the deceased. The majority did not mention Wheeler
even though, in dissent, justices Holmes, Stone and Brandeis stated that "the
tax (by the state of physical situs) was warranted by decisions of this court,"
citing Wheeler.218 Here, too, the dissenters were correct only if the plurality
opinion is considered as the holding. Similarly, lower federal courts have several
times described Wheeler as laying down the "situs" rule.219
Most of the other citations of Wheeler have been for a view obtained by com-
bining its plurality and minority opinions. 220 This apparent lack of predominant
citation for plurality opinion is perhaps explained by the fact that the result in
Wheeler was essentially reversed by the later "double taxation" cases.22' As a
result, subsequent use of the case has been more or less confined to the points
upon which the two victorious opinions agreed.
In summary, it must be borne in mind that the "technical minority" cases
differ only in degree from the "coordinate opinion" cases discussed above. Ac-
cepting the strong technical distinction, one might expect that cases involving
technical minorities would be cited, if at all, for their plurality opinions. In this
sense the "technical minority" cases closely approach the "silent concurrence"
cases. As has been seen, this expectation accords in most instances with actual
citation practice.222
218 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 215 (1930).
217 Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930).
218 Ibid., at 596.
219 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Comm'r, 63 F.2d 685 (C.A. 1st, 1933); Howbert v. Pen-
rose, 38 F.2d 577 (C.A. 10th, 1930); Seligmaun v. Mills, 25 F.2d 807 (C.A. 8th, 1928).
220 Brook & Co. v. Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County, 8 Cal.2d 286, 289, 65 P.2d
791, 793 (1937); Lockwood v. Blodgett, 106 Conn. 525, 538, 138 Atl. 520, 524 (1927); In re
Waldron's Estate, 84 Colo. 1, 10, 267 Pac. 191, 194 (1928); State ex rel. Rankin v. Harrington,
68 Mont. 1, 30, 217 Pac. 681, 688 (1923); Yardley v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 93
N.J.L. 290, 292, 108 Atl. 299, 300 (1919); Matter of Scott's Estate, 129 Misc. 625, 628, 222
N.Y.S. 515, 518 (Surr. Ct., 1927); Matter of Gates, 243 N.Y. 193, 196, 153 N.E. 45, 46 (1926);
Hagood v. Doughton, 195 N.C. 811, 821, 143 S.E. 841, 846 (1928); Beidler v. South Carolina
Tax Comm'n, 162 S.C. 447,456, 160 S.E. 264, 267 (1927); Fuller v. Tax Comm'n, 128 S.C. 14,
23, 121 S.E. 478, 481 (1924).
2L E.g., Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930).
2The recent case of United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953), illus-
trates the converse of the "technical minority" cases. It arose on an appeal by the govern-
19561 COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
C. Narrow Minority
The "narrow minority" subgroup of cases is characterized by the presence of
a minority concurring opinion which is analytically not in conflict with the
plurality opinion, except insofar as the plurality is broader than the minority.
In other words, the minority opinion is literally "telescoped" within the plurali-
ty opinion. These cases may be distinguished from the "technical minority"
cases, depending on whether or not the minority is found to agree, at least in
part, with the reasoning of the plurality.
It will be noted that the "narrow minority" cases closely resemble clear-
majority decisions, at least insofar as there is "telescoped" agreement between
the concurring opinions. This agreement is of course represented only by the
minority. It is thus significant that these cases are cited approximately one-
fourth of the time for their plurality opinions, although no clear majority has ac-
cepted all of the views therein expressed. There are three cases in this subgroup:
Northern Securities Co. v. United States,2 2 Haley v. Ohi 224 and Burns v. Wilson. 25
In Northern Securities Co. v. United States, the government brought suit under
the Sherman Act against the Northern Securities Company, a holding company,
its subsidiaries, two competing and substantially parallel railroad lines, and
certain shareholders. A decree granting the relief requested was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in a 4-1-(4) split.
ment from a dismissal of indictments for failure to comply with registration and reporting
requirement for dealers in gambling devices. The indictment contained no allegation that the
devices had moved or would move in interstate commerce. The Court affirmed the dismissal,
splitting 3-2-(4).
Justices Jackson, Frankfurter and Minton held that a literal reading of the statute re-
quired that the devices be involved in interstate commerce. Thus, in the absence of such an
allegation, dismissal was proper. Justices Black and Douglas concurred. They asserted that
the statute did not require interstate movement but decided that it denied due process because
of vagueness. In dissent, Justices Clark, Warren, Reed and Burton agreed with Black and
Douglas that the act was not limited to interstate sales, but did not agree that the act was
unconstitutionally vague. They further asserted that it was a valid exercise of congressional
power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper clauses.
Thus Five Gambling Devices might be termed a "technical plurality" decision. The
plurality opinion was based on a narrow construction of the statute while a broad principle
of constitutional law provided the basis for the concurring minority opinion.
Only once has Five Gambling Devices been cited for more than its general result. In
Jenkins v. Durkin, 208 F.2d 941 (C.A. 5th, 1954), clear reference was made to the plurality
opinion in the following manner: "We are particularly of the view that when the question of
the exertion of congressional power over activities occurring wholly within a state is concerned,
courts ought not to, indeed they may not,... extend the congressional enactment beyond its
reasonable confines, cf. United States v. Five Gambling Devices." Ibid., at 945. The remain-
ing cases, typically per curiam opinion, cite Five Gambling Devices for its general result:
United States v. J. & W. Music Co., 212 F.2d 958 (C.A. 5th, 1954); United States v. Loyal
Order of Moose, 211 F.2d 406 (C.A. 5th, 1954); United States v. American Legion Post, 209
F.2d 511 (C.A. 5th, 1954).
-3 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
-4 332 U.S. 596 (1946). ' 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
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Justices Harlan, Brown, McKenna and Day stated that the combination was
in restraint of trade within the meaning of the Act. It was their position that
the Sherman Act 22s declared illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy
which directly or necessarily operated in restraint of trade among the several
states or with foreign nations and was not limited to restraints which are un-
reasonable in nature. Also, the application of the Act in this case was not an
unauthorized interference with the internal commerce of the states creating the
corporations involved. Justice Brewer concurred, but would limit the broad
language of the Harlan opinion. It was his view that the Sherman Act only
included within its scope contracts which were unreasonable restraints of inter-
state trade, and that the control of both railroads through the Northern Securi-
ties Company constituted such an unreasonable restraint of trade. In two sepa-
rate dissents, Justices White, Holmes,227 Fuller and Peckham argued that the
ownership of stock in the railroads was not commerce at all and therefore Con-
gress was without power to regulate it. And, even if Congress had such power,
it had not exercised it.
It seems clear that if the plurality was willing to strike down contracts of the
type herein involved without regard to their reasonableness, they would cer-
tainly agree with the minority in striking unreasonable contracts. Thus a clear
majority of the Court may be interpreted as agreeing with the minority opinion,
although four of the justices would have gone even further.
The most prevalent use of Northern. Securities as precedent has been for its
general result.228 However, a great number of subsequent courts have cited it
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. §§1-7 (1951).
2-7 "I am happy to know that only a minority of my brethren adopt an interpretation of the
law which in my opinion would make eternal the bellum omnium contra omnes and disinte-
grate society so far as it could into individual atoms." Mr. justice Holmes dissenting in
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 411 (1904).
= United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); Mandeville Farms v. Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United
States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.n. 110 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918) (dissent); United States v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
226 U.S. 61 (1912); United States v. Terminal R.R. Association of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383
(1912); Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U.S. 401, 409 (1905); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (dissent); Carleton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming, 126 F.2d 537, 541
(C.A. 8th, 1942); Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 92 F.2d 580, 588 (C.A. 2d, 1937); Penn-
sylvania R. Co. v. ICC, 66 F.2d, 37,40 (C.A. 3d, 1933); National Nut Co. v. Kelling Nut Co.,
61 F.Supp. 76,81 (N.D. Ill., 1945); United States v. Spokane Fuel Dealers Credit Association,
55 F.Supp. 387, 392 (E.D. Wash., 1944); Marshall Transport v. United States, 52 F.Supp.
1010, 1015 (D. Md., 1943); United States v. Edwards, 14 F.Supp. 384, 390 (S.D. Cal., 1936);
United States v. Schechter, 8 F.Supp. 136, 147 (E.D.N.Y., 1934); Barbour v. Thomas, 7
F.Supp. 271, 278 (E.D. Mich., 1933); United States v. Appalachian Coals, Inc., 1 F.Supp.
339, 343 (W.D. Va., 1932); United States v. Reading R. Co., 226 Fed. 229, 272 (E.D. Pa.,
1915); United States v. Whiting, 212 Fed. 466, 473 (D. Mass., 1914); United States v. Patter-
son, 201 Fed. 697, 710 (S.D. Ohio, 1912); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 191 Fed.
371, 375 (S.D.N.Y., 1911); Steel v. United Fruit Co., 190 Fed. 631, 633 (E.D. La., 1911);
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for the view expressed by its plurality opinion .1 9 Still another court stated:
"The opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan to the extent of Mr. Justice Brewer's con-
currence correctly stated the principles governing the construction of the Act
then under consideration."23 0 A final few have explicitly recognized the lack of
United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 188 Fed. 102, 120 (D. Utah, 1911) (dissent); United
States v. Swift, 186 Fed. 1002, 1014 (N.D. Ill., 1911); United States v. Reading R. Co., 183
Fed. 427, 455 (E.D. Pa., 1910); St. Louis & S.F. R. Co. v. Cross, 171 Fed. 480, 494 (W.D.
Okla., 1909); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 Fed. 177, 185 (E.D. Mo., 1909); Bigelow
v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 167 Fed. 704, 714 (W.D. Mich., 1908); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed. 700, 726 (S.D.N.Y., 1908); United States v. Southern Ry.
Co., 164 Fed. 347, 354 (N.D. Ala., 1908); Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 155 Fed.
869, 875 (W.D. Mich., 1907); United States v. Adair, 152 Fed. 737, 750 (E.D. Ky., 1907); In
re Charge to Grand Jury, 151 Fed. 834, 842 (E.D. Ga., 1907); Camors-McConnell Co. v. Mc-
Connell, 140 Fed. 412, 414 (S.D. Ala., 1905); Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 139 Fed. 155, 193
(S.D.N.Y., 1905); Tift v. Southern Ry. Co., 138 Fed. 753, 762 (W.D. Ga., 1905); Southern
Ry. Co. v. Baker, 158 Ga. 830, 839, 124 S.E. 876, 879 (1924); Dunbar v. A.T. & T. Co., 224
Ill. 9, 23, 79 N.E. 423, 427 (1906); Attorney General v. Booth & Co., 143 Mich. 89, 102, 106
N.W. 868, 873 (1906); State v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 133 Minn. 413, 419, 158 N.W. 627,
629 (1916); State v. Armour Packing Co., 265 Mo. 121, 147, 176 S.W. 382,389 (1915); Delevan
v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 154 App.Div. 8, 43, 139 N.Y.S. 17, 42 (1st Dep't, 1912);
Clark v. Memphis St. Ry. Co., 123 Tenn. 232, 244, 130 S.W. 751, 754 (1910); California State
Life Ins. Co. v. Kring, 208 S.W. 372, 375 (Tex. Civ. App., 1918); State v. International &
G.N. Ry. Co., 107 Tex. 349, 356, 179 S.W. 867, 870 (1915); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State,
48 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 179, 106 S.W. 918, 925 (1907); State ex rel. Cascade R. Co. v. Superior
Court, 51 Wash. 346, 350, 98 Pac. 739, 740 (1909).
2'1 United States v. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 562 (1944); American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 400 (1921); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212
U.S. 86, 110 (1909); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 297 (1908); American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 147 F.2d 93, 111 (C.A. 6th, 1945); United States v. ALCOA, 148 F.2d 416,429
(C.A. 2d, 1945); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 141 F.2d 606, 622 (C.A. 1st, 1944);
White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600, 604 (C.A. 8th, 1942);
United Leather Workers International Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 284 Fed. 446,
450 (C.A. 8th, 1922); Darvis Cole Transportation Co. v. White Star Line, 186 Fed. 63, 65
(C.A. 6th, 1911); Arkansas Brokerage Co. v. Dunn & Powell, 173 Fed. 899, 901 (C.A. 8th,
1909); Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 167 Fed. 721, 725 (C.A. 6th, 1909); Wheeler-
Stenzel Co. v. Nat'l Window Glass Jobbers Ass'n, 152 Fed. 864, 868 (C.A. 3d, 1907); Conti-
nental Wall Paper Co. v. Lewis Voight & Sons, 148 Fed. 939, 946 (C.A. 6th, 1906); United
States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F.Supp. 642, 647 (S.D.N.Y., 1944); United States v.
International Harvester, 214 Fed. 987, 1003 (D. Minn., 1914) (dissent); United States v.
Great Lakes Towing Co., 208 Fed. 733, 741 (N.D. Ohio, 1913); United States v. Lake Shore
& M.S. Ry. Co., 203 Fed. 295, 317 (S.D. Ohio, 1912); United States v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
188 Fed. 102, 110 (D. Utah, 1911); United States v. Reading Co., 183 Fed. 427,460,470 (E.D.
Pa., 1910) (dissent); Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 178 Fed. 117, 124
(E.D.N.C., 1910); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed. 700, 707 (S.D.N.Y.,
1908); Burrows v. Interborough Metropolitan Co., 156 Fed. 389, 397 (S.D.N.Y., 1907);
State v. Western & Aft. R. Co., 138 Ga. 835, 842, 76 S.E. 577, 580 (1912); Knight & Jillson
Co. v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 37, 87 N.E. 823, 828 (1909); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Paine &
Nixon Co., 182 Minn. 159, 164, 234 N.W. 453, 455 (1-931); Kosciusko Oil Mill & Fertilizer Co.
v. Wilson, 90 Miss. 551, 557, 43 So. 435, 437 (1907); State v. Adams Lumber Co., 81 Neb.
392, 413, 116 N.W. 302,310 (1908); Gallup Electric Light Co. v. Pacific Improvement Co., 16
N.M. 86, 92, 113 Pac. 848, 850 (1911); Senior v. New York City Ry. Co., 111 App.Div. 39,
49, 97 N.Y.Supp. 645, 652 (1st Dep't, 1906); State v. Anthony, 179 Ore. 282, 293, 169 P.2d
587, 592 (1946).
210 State v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 71 S.C. 544, 568, 51 S.E. 455, 463 (1905). But
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express clear-majority agreement as to the reasons supporting the judgment
and have thus given Vorthern Securities little weight as precedent. 231
In Haley v. Ohio, a fifteen year old defendant had been convicted in a state
court of murder. He appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming a violation of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Following his arrest, the defendant
had been questioned by the police from midnight until 5:00 A.M., after which
he had signed an alleged confession containing a formal indication that the de-
fendant had been advised of his constitutional rights prior to signing. There
was controverted evidence of his having been beaten during this questioning
period. After this episode, the defendant was held incommunicado for three
days even though his mother and a lawyer attempted to see him. Over objec-
tion, the confession was introduced at the trial. This was held erroneous by the
Supreme Court, in a 4-1-(4) split.
Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy and Rutledge stated that the introduction
of the confession as evidence was a violation of due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment. They stated that "[tihe age of petitioner, the hours when
he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or
counsel to advise him, the callous attitude of the police towards his rights"2 32
combined to prove coercion in obtaining the confession. The opinion rejected
the argument that the defendant had been apprised of his constitutional rights
compare the analysis of the court in Monongahela River Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v.
Jutte, 210 Pa. 288, 59 Atl. 1088 (1904), where the court cited the Harlan view authoritatively,
though it recognized the lack of a clear majority. It justified its use of Northern Securities on
the ground that Justice Brewer did agree that the contract in the case operated as a direct
restraint on interstate commerce.
As might be expected under this analysis, the minority view of Mr. Justice Brewer has
been cited more frequently than is usually the case where a single justice concurs. Apex Hosiery
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 498 (1940); Mitchell Woodbury Corp. v. Albert Pick Barth Co., 41
F.2d 148, 150 (C.A. 1st, 1930) (Harlan's opinion incorrectly cited for "unreasonableness"
rule); Bluefields S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 Fed. 1, 14 (C.A. 3d, 1917); United v. Inter-
Island Steam Navigation Co., 87 F.Supp. 1010, 1020 (D. Hawaii, 1950); United States v.
Colgate & Co., 253 Fed. 522, 526 (E.D. Va., 1918); United States v. Kellogg Toasted Corn
Flake Co., 222 Fed. 725, 731 (E.D. Mich., 1915); O'Halloran v. American Sea Green Slate
Co., 207 Fed. 187, 189 (N.D.N.Y., 1913); McCarter v. Fireman's Insurance Co., 74 N.J.Eq.
372, 408, 73 Atl. 414, 420 (1909).
231 Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 95, 96 (1911) (by implication); American
Federation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 89 F.Supp. 12, 14, 15 (W.D. Va., 1950); United States
v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578, 587 (D. Mass., 1912); Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Rice, 186 Fed.
204, 211 (M.D. Ala., 1910); State v. Coyle, 7 Okla.Cr. 50, 83, 122 Pac. 243, 258 (1912); Pulp-
wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604,619, 147 N.W. 1058, 1064 (1914) (by
implication). Analysis of the use of Northern Securities as a precedent by subsequent courts
must of course take account of subsequent Supreme Court cases which may have clarified the
dispute in the primary case. For example, in Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911),
the Court, by a clear majority, seems to have adopted a position similar to that advocated by
Justice Brewer in Northern Securities. Although such subsequent clarification may indicate
why the primary case has not been cited frequently or authoritatively, it does not in any way
justify improper use of the primary case as a precedent.
212 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-601 (1948).
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before he signed and stated that "a boy of fifteen, without aid of counsel,
[would not] have a full appreciation of that advice and that on the facts of this
record he [did not have] ... a freedom of choice."2" 3 Justice Frankfurter con-
curred in a separate opinion. The basic difference in his rationale arose from
"doubts and difficulties" which he entertained because of the "delicate exercise
of power" in reversing a state court's conviction for want of due process. He
stated that the question of coercion, when the defendant was only fifteen years
old, was not "a matter of mathematical determination," but rather it invited
psychological judgment. From this he concluded that a fifteen year old defend-
ant is not always incapable of exercising free choice of action and that he would
not "dispose of this case by finding in the Due Process Clause Constitutional
outlawry of the admissibility of all private statements made by an accused to
a police officer."2 3 4 The thrust of his separate opinion apparently is that he
would be more inclined to adopt a case by case approach in interpreting the
Due Process clause and that he felt that the Douglas opinion was too general in
its rejection of confessions of fifteen-year-old boys elicited without presence of
counsel. Justices Burton, Vinson, Reed and Jackson dissented. They concluded
that a finding of a violation of due process in this case would be based on pure
conjecture, that the question rested upon controverted evidence and that the
state courts were the appropriate tribunals to determine the outcome in such
a situation. An independent review should rarely overturn the result obtained
by the state court when "credibility plays as large a part in the record as it does
in this case.
'2 5
The great majority of citations to Haley have been references to its general
result, largely contained in discussions concluding that coerced confessions are
inadmissible.23 1 Some cases go so far as to recognize the lack of an express clear
233 Ibid., at 601. 214 Ibid., at 603.
235 Ibid., at 623.
236 Thirty-one cases were discovered to have used Haley in this manner: Leyra v. Denno,
347 U.S. 556 (1954); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
(1949); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948);
United States v. Baldi, 198 F.2d 113 (C.A. 3d, 1952); United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848
(C.A. 2d, 1951); Behrens v. Hironimus, 166 F.2d 245 (C.A. 4th, 1948); Smith v. State, 253
Ala. 220, 43 So.2d 821 (1950); Ingram v. State, 34 Ala.App. 597, 42 So.2d 30 (1949); Huntley
v. State, 250 Ala. 303,34 So.2d 216 (1948); Barnes & York v. State, 217 Ark. 244, 229 S.W.2d
484 (1950); Palmer v. State, 213 Ark. 956, 214 S.W.2d 372 (1948); People v. Stroble, 36
Cal.2d 615, 226 P.2d 330 (1951); People v. Doty, 31 Cal.2d 696, 192 P.2d 454 (1948); State v.
Buteau, 136 Conn. 113, 68 A.2d 681 (1949); People v. Thomlison, 400 Ill. 555, 81 N.E.2d 434
(1948); State v. Wilson, 214 La. 317, 37 So.2d 804 (1948); Grammer v. State, 203 Md. 200,
100 A.2d 257 (1953); James v. State, 193 Md. 31, 65 A.2d 888 (1949); Baltimore Radio Show
v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949); State v. Boudreau, 67 Nev. 36, 214 P.2d 135 (1950);
State v. Pierce, 4 N.J. 252, 72 A.2d 305 (1950); Hendrickson v. State, 93 Okla.Cr. 379, 229
P.2d 196 (1951); Williams v. State, 89 Okla.Cr. 95, 205 P.2d 524 (1949); Benton v. State, 86
Okla.Cr. 137, 190 P.2d 168 (1948); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 367 Pa. 135,79 A.2d 193 (1951);
Commonwealth v. Baldi, 166 Pa.Super. 413, 72 A.2d 150 (1950); Commonwealth v. Johnson,
365 Pa. 303, 74 A.2d 144 (1950); State v. Brown, 212 S.C. 237, 47 S.E.2d 521 (1948); Holt v.
State, 151 Tex.Cr. 399, 208 S.W.2d 643 (1948).
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majority and then cite Haley for the points of agreement between the plurality
and minority opinion.237 However, several courts have stated that Haley held
all confessions obtained while the confessor is unlawfully detained are inadmis-
sible 23-a view which can be derived only from the plurality opinion, and
which was specifically rejected by the minority.23 9 In summary, the "narrow
minority" cases differ from the "technical minority" cases insofar as the latter
contain no logical connection between plurality and minority opinion, while in
the former the minority lays down a rule which is telescoped by the plurality.
Despite this area of agreement between the two opinions in the "narrow
minority" cases, it is believed that they are properly classified as no-clear-
majority cases, since their majorities do not agree on the rule supporting the
result. Finally, although the "narrow minority" cases approach clear-majority
decisions insofar as the minority reasoning is accepted (so far as it goes) by the
217 Garner v. United States, 174 F.2d 499,504 (App. D.C., 1949) (dissent); Linkins v. State,
202 Md. 212, 218, 96 A.2d 246, 249 (1953) (The court apparently transposed the Frankfurter
and Douglas views but would have arrived at the same conclusion anyway.).
238 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338U.S. 68,73 (1949)
(In these two cases, Justice Douglas, who wrote the Haley plurality opinion, stated that Haley
"unequivocally" denied admissibility of confessions when obtained during unlawful detention.
In neither case was he speaking for the Court.); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 738 (1948)
(Haley distinguished); Palmer v. State, 213 Ark. 956, 959, 214 S.W.2d 372, 373 (1948) (dis-
sent). Several attempts by counsel to exploit this view of Haley have failed when courts have
specifically refused to adopt it as the holding of that case. Consult United States ex rel. Mayo
v. Burke, 93 F.Supp. 490, 493 (E.D. Pa., 1950); United States v. Calp, 83 F.Supp. 152, 153
(D.Md., 1949); Commonwealth v. Turner, 371 Pa. 417,422,88 A.2d 915,918 (1952).
239 Another decision which may be classified in the "narrow minority" subgroup is Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). It affirmed dismissal of an application for habeas corpus sought
on grounds of denial of due process. The petitioner had been convicted by court-martial of
murder and rape and sentenced to death. Justices Vinson, Reed, Burton and Clark rendered an
opinion indicating that the elements of due process applied to military courts as well as civil
courts. However, the scope of review in the former was more restricted than that of the latter,
being limited to a determination of whether the military courts had dealt fully and fairly with
each claim, i.e., whether due process had been denied. Justice Minton, concurring, would have
limited the scope of review of military proceedings by federal courts under writs of habeas
corpus to a determination of whether the military court had jurisdiction, without permitting
the federal courts to determine questions of due process. Justice Jackson concurred without
opinion. Justices Douglas and Black dissented. They would allow review of the facts when,
though having considered the issues, the military court had not correctly applied standards
of due process. It is interesting to note that this opinion refers to that of the plurality as "the
opinion of the Court." Justice Frankfurter neither concurred nor dissented. He indicated some
disagreement with all the opinions, and wanted the case set down for reargument. There is
thus a 4-1-1-[l]-(2) split. The "narrow minority" telescoping effect involves the plurality and
Minton, who appears to agree except insofar as the plurality justices were willing to go even
further. Note in this regard that the silent concurrence aspect of Burns is not dispositive, and
is therefore not significant for the purposes of this comment. Consult note 190 supra.
Burns is recent and has not been cited often. Several cases cite the rationale of the plurality
as that of the Court. Suttles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760 (C.A. 10th, 1954); Easley v. Hunter, 209
F.2d 483 (C.A. 10th, 1953); White v. Humphrey, 212 F.2d 503 (C.A. 3d, 1954) (The Suttles
case first cited Burns for a proposition on which Vinson and Minton could agree but then pro-
ceeded to cite the Vinson rationale as that of the Court.). Only one case cited what might be
the Minton view as the holding of the case.
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plurality, they have nonetheless been cited to some extent for the view stated
by the plurality. The "narrow minority" cases also present the further problem
of distinguishing the degree of difference between the plurality and minority
rationales. If this difference is deemed minor, the case is of course a clear-
majority decision. Thus, only cases containing reasonably distinct rules have
been considered here.
D. Broad Minority
Cases in the "broad minority" subgroup present the converse of the situation
found in the "narrow minority" cases. Here, there is a narrow plurality and a
broad minority, with the latter telescoping the former. To the extent that the
minority view does encompass that of the plurality the latter, in effect, expresses
a clear-majority position. As might be expected, these cases are cited almost
exclusively for the position taken by their plurality opinions. Four cases have
been included in this subgroup: Kovacs v. Cooper,240 Watts v. Indiana,24 Harris
v. South Carolina 24 and Turner v. Pennsylvania. 43
In Kovacs a city ordinance making unlawful the operation, on the public
streets, alleys and thoroughfares, of a sound truck which emitted loud and
raucous noises was upheld against a claim that it was a violation of Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it contravened rights of freedom of
speech, freedom of assemblage and freedom to communicate information and
opinions to others.
Justices Reed, Vinson and Burton upheld the ordinance as a valid instance
of municipal regulation, interpreting the state court's opinion as holding that
the ordinance was limited to the barring of loud and raucous noises. Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson each wrote concurring opinions arguing that all
mechanical sound amplifying devices were subject to regulation or prohibition
by state or municipal authorities. Dissenting, Justices Black, Douglas and
Rutledge concluded from the record and opinion of the state court that the con-
viction was not for emitting "raucous" noises, so that the issue was whether or
not an absolute prohibition of amplifying devices could be upheld. They argued
that such an absolute prohibition infringed on the constitutionally protected
area of free speech.144 Justice Murphy dissented without opinion.
240 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 242 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
241 338 U.S. 49 (1949). 243 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
244 Rutledge wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he pointed out that a majority
of the Court (Frankfurter, Jackson, Black, Douglas and Rutledge) agreed that the issue was
whether or not all sound trucks could be prohibited without reference to whether "loud and
raucous noises" were emitted or not, while only a minority (Reed, Vinson and Burton) thought
that the issue was limited to "loud and raucous noises." He further pointed out that this mi-
nority, coupled with Frankfurter and Jackson, comprised a majority which sustained the
ordinance and its application. As to the precedent value of the decision Rutledge commented:
"What the effect of this decision may be I cannot foretell, except that Kovacs will stand con-
victed and the division among the majority voting to affirm leaves open for future determina-
tion whether absolute and total state prohibition of sound trucks in public places can stand
consistently with the First Amendment." 336 U.S. 77, 105 (1949).
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Thus the Court apparently split 3-2-(3-1). The fact that the plurality posi-
tion was telescoped by the broad minority opinion is reflected in the citation
pattern of Kovacs: The case has been cited only as upholding the prohibition
of "loud and raucous" noises. 45 Even though it has been said that its limits are
"not clear, '2 4 Kovacs has not been used to justify a general prohibition of all
sound trucks.
Walls, Harris and Turner all present similar facts and were decided in a con-
sistent manner on the same day. Each case involved the illegal detention of a
murder suspect for a period of days without aid of counsel, friends or advice as
to constitutional rights, who, after prolonged questioning had rendered a con-
fession. Upon conviction for murder, it was asserted that the admission into
evidence of a confession procured by such means was a denial of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. All convictions were reversed.
Justices Frankfurter, Mlurphy and Rutledge concurred in each of the prin-
cipal cases, holding the admission of the confessions to be a violation of due
process. It was their position that any confession by an individual who had been
overborne and subjected to physical or mental torture is not voluntary and is
therefore inadmissible. Justice Black concurred in each case, adopting a posi-
tion substantially identical to that of the Frankfurter plurality. justice Douglas
also concurred in each case. He would go even further than the Frankfurter
view, and outlaw any confession, voluntary or not, which is obtained during
unlawful detention. Justice Jackson was the only justice who did not decide all
these cases in a similar manner-concurring in Watts, and dissenting in Harris
and Turner. He also accepted the Frankfurter position, with the qualification
that involuntary confessions should nevertheless be admissible if verified or
corroborated in such a manner as to leave no doubt that they were genuine and
truthful.
Analytically, only Turner and Harris are true "broad minority" cases. In
each, the minority (Douglas) accepts the views expressed by the plurality
(Frankfurter-Black), and differs only insofar as the plurality does not, as a
practical matter, go far enough. In Watts, the Jackson minority must also be
245Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollock, 343 U.S. 451, 464 (1952) (Justice Burton stated
for the Court that "[1legislation prohibiting the making of loud and raucous noises has been
upheld."); F.&A. Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 98 F.Supp, 180, 185 (S.D. Cal., 1951)
(Kovacs cited as upholding statute prohibiting "loud and raucous" noises); Haggerty v,
Fresno County, 267 P.2d 370, 373 (Cal., 1954); Haggerty v. Kings County, 117 Cal.App.2d.
470, 481, 256 P.2d 393, 400 (1953); People v. Kunz, 300 N.Y. 273, 278, 90 N.E.2d 455, 457
(1949) (All three of these cases discussed Kovacs in terms of "loud and mucous," and the
latter case cited Kovacs for the proposition that "a community can bar from its streets all
raucously noisy advertising devices."). justice Vinson intimated that the plurality opinion was
the holding when he said in American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
398 (1950), that"[w]e have noted that the blaring sound truck invades the privacy of the home
and may drown out others who may wish to be heard." Differing from the above cases, Dayton
v. Zoller, 96 Ohio App. 424, 427, 122 N.E.2d, 28, 29 (1954), recognized the split. Nevertheless
that case referred to the Reed opinion as the "majority" opinion and used it as authority.
21 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 280 (1951) (Frankfurter).
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considered. It would appear to differ on the point of allowing verification, and
is thus the narrowest opinion. Watts therefore is both a "narrow" and "broad"
minority case, but will be considered in the latter category because of its simi-
larity to Turner and Harris and because the Jackson concurrence therein is not
necessarily dispositive. In terms of clear majorities-six justices would agree at
least on the "qualified voluntariness" test, five on the "unqualified voluntari-
ness" test, and one on the "unlawful detention" test.
Most later courts have cited these cases for the Frankfurter-Black rationale
excluding involuntary confessions3 47 They have also been cited for their general
result."' No citations have been found for the Jackson qualification or broad
24 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954) (Watts); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 154
(1953) (dissent) (Watts); United States v. Claudy, 204 F.2d 624, 627 (C.A. 2d, 1953) (Watts);
United States v. Baldi, 198 F.2d 113, 117 (C.A. 3d, 1952) (Watts); Judd v. United States, 190
F.2d 649, 652 (App. D.C., 1951) (Watts); United States v. Burke, 93 F.Supp. 490, 493 (E.D.
Pa., 1950) (Watts, Harris and Turner); Perkins v. State, 217 Ark. 252, 260, 230 S.W.2d 1, 5
(1950) (Watts, Harris andTurner); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434,448-49,282 P.2d 905, 913-
14 (1955) (Harris); Downey v. People, 121 Colo. 307, 316, 324, 215 P.2d 892, 896, 901 (1950)
(Watts, Harris and Turner); People v. Varela, 405 Ill. 236, 245, 90 N.E.2d 631, 635 (1950)
(Watts, Harris and Turner); Pearman v. State, 233 Ind. 111, 116, 117 N.E.2d 362,365 (1954)
(Watts); Krauss v. State, 229 Ind. 625, 632, 100 N.E.2d 824, 827 (1951) (Watts, Harris and
Turner); Watts v. State, 229 Ind. 80, 110, 95 N.E.2d 570, 583 (1950) (Watts); Willennar v.
State, 228 Ind. 248, 252, 91 N.E.2d 178, 179 (1950) (Watts); Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 660,
88 N.E.2d 386, 391 (1949) (Watts); State v. Archer, 244 Iowa 1045, 1054, 58 N.W.2d 44, 48
(1953) (Watts and Turner); Day v. State, 196 Md. 384, 397, 76 A.2d 729, 735 (1950) (Watts,
Harris and Turner); Winston v. State, 209 Miss. 799, 802, 48 So.2d 513, 514 (1950) (Watts);
State v. Bradford, 262 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Mo., 1953) (Watts, Harris and Turner); State v.
Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 559, 67 A.2d 298, 307 (1949) (Watts, Harris and Turner); State v. Linde-
muth, 56 N.M. 257, 265, 243 P.2d 325, 330 (1952) (Watts); People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353,
364, 98 N.E.2d 553, 559 (1951) (Watts, Harris and Turner); Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378
Pa. 412,422, 106 A.2d 820,826 (1954) (Turner); Commonwealth v. Smith, 374 Pa. 220,232, 97
A.2d 25, 32 (1953) (Watts and Turner); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Pa. 303, 312, 74
A.2d 144, 148 (1950) (Watts, Harris and Turner); Commonwealth v. Tunstall, 178 Pa.Super.
359,363,115 A.2d 914,916 (1955) (Watts); Commonwealth v. Burke, 172 Pa.Super. 400,404,94
A.2d 87, 89 (1953) (Watts, Harris and Turner); Commonwealth v. Baldi, 166 Pa.Super. 413,
423, 72 A.2d 150, 153 (1950) (Watts, Harris and Turner); Prince v. State, 155 Tex.Cr. 108,
111, 231 S.W.2d 419,421 (1950) (Watts, Harris and Turner); State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450,
457, 229 P.2d 289, 292 (1951) (Watts and Turner); State v. Babich, 258 Wis. 290, 300, 45
N.W.2d 660, 664 (1951) (Watts). East v. State, 277 S.W.2d 361,363 (Tenn., 1955), stated that
"Jackson concurred with the majority opinion." This is apparently a reference to the Frank-
furter-Black rationale as the holding.
In addition, six state citations seem to cite the Watts group for the Frankfurter view,
although they may also be construed to stand merely for the general result: Barnes v. State,
217 Ark. 244, 250, 229 S.W.2d 484, 487 (1950); Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 29, 92 A.2d
570, 572 (1952); State v. Pierce, 4 N.J. 252, 259, 72 A.2d 305, 309 (1950); People v. Perez,
300 N.Y. 208, 217, 90 N.E.2d 40, 45 (1950); Commonwealth v. Turner, 371 Pa. 417, 423, 88
A.2d 915, 918 (1952); Commonwealth v. Bryant 367 Pa. 135, 148, 79 A.2d 193, 199 (1951).
2148 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 203
(1952); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123 (1951); United States v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579,
584 (C.A. 7th, 1949); People v. Millum, 42 Cal.2d 524, 527, 267, P.2d 1039, 1041 (1954);
State v. Cooper, 10 N.J. 532, 551, 92 A.2d 786, 795 (1952); State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 470, 73
A.2d 249, 254 (1950); Commonwealth v. Burke, 367 Pa. 152, 158, 79 A.2d 654, 657 (1951);
Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464, 482, 72 A.2d 575, 584 (1950); State v. Waitus, 224
S.C. 12, 27, 77 S.E.2d 256, 263 (1953).
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Douglas view.2 49 It is interesting to note that few cases mention the split.2so
In summary, the "broad minority" cases are cited predominantly for their
plurality opinions. This involves using the primary decision for a proposition
which was not explicitly agreed upon by a majority of the justices sitting. How-
249 In State v. Gardner, 119 Utah 579, 589, 230 P.2d 559, 564 (1951), counsel urged that a
confession obtained while defendant was wrongfully held in confinement was inadmissible,
citing Watts, Harris and Turner. The court properly rejected this view, pointing out that the
only member of the Court to whom it could be attributed was Douglas. Grear v. State, 194Md.
335, 349, 71 A.2d 24, 31 (1950), flirted with the marginal justice analyses when it spoke of the
Frankfurter opinion as "the only one (except for the statement of three dissenting justices)
which spoke for more than one justice and which expressed the marginal view of three justices
necessary for the decision."
A possible second explanation, explicitly stated by no citing case, of the Watts cases and
their subsequent citation is that the three dissenters did not explicitly reject the Frankfurter or
Black position but rather affirmed because of their view of the facts and the state courts'
consideration of them. Thus, if the dissenters merely disagreed on the facts but agreed as to
which rule should be applied, a majority of the Court could be cited for that rule.
25 0 The well-known decision of Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951), combines factors characteristic of the "technical," "narrow" and "broad" minority
series. It is unique in that a total of five majority concurring opinions were rendered, each of
which--save one-representing the views of but one justice. The Attorney General, claiming
authority under an Executive Order, and without hearing, had designated the plaintiff organi-
zations as Communistic and furnished their names to the Loyalty Review Board of the
United States Civil Service Commission. The district court dismissed their complaint seeking
an injunction and declaratory relief.
Justice Burton joined by justice Douglas delivered an opinion ordering reversal because
the Attorney General, by acting arbitrarily, had acted outside the scope of the authority grant-
ed to him under the Executive Order. It was further concluded that the plaintiffs in this case
had standing to sue since "the touchstone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected
right." Justice Black rendered an opinion indicating agreement with Burton that the Attorney
General had exceeded his authority under the Executive Order, but further stating that the
Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment would bar such a listing without notice and a
fair hearing. This opinion finally denounced the listing with or without a hearing as a violation
of the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder. Justice Frankfurter, rejecting the
narrow limitations of the Burton opinion, concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to sue and
had a cause of action because the listing without a hearing deprived them of due process.
Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion, agreed that due process had been violated but indi-
cated that even if hearings had been provided, he would regard the "dragnet system of loyalty
trials which has been entrusted to the administrative agencies of government" as unconstitu-
tional. His interpretation of the rationale of the decision is worth noting: "While I join in the
opinion of Mr. Justice Burton, which would dispose of the case on procedural grounds, the
Court has decided them on the Constitution." (Italics added.) Justice Jackson, recognizing the
disagreement among the members of the Court, indicated that no view had "attracted suffi-
cient adherents for a Court." His own views were that the organization could not sue on
their own behalf but could vindicate the unconstitutional deprivation of their members'
rights, and here the members had been deprived of their constitutional rights of due process
because of the lack of a hearing at any stage. The dissenters, Justices Reed, Vinson and
Minton, agreed that Burton's decision went beyond the pleadings and went on to question
whether the First Amendment or due process had been violated.
On the merits, the "technical" aspect of Joint is represented by those justices deciding on
statutory construction grounds of the Attorney General's exceeding his authority (Burton,
Black and Douglas). The "narrow" position is violation of due process because of lack of notice
and hearing (Black, Frankfurter, Douglas and Jackson). The "broad" ground is the view of
unconstitutionality even if there had been a hearing (Black and Douglas). Other issues, such as
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ever, analytically this may perhaps be justified by inferring support from the
broad minority concurring opinion. Insofar as this is done, the "broad minority"
cases may be considered as clear-majority decisions-at least for the view
stated in their narrow plurality opinions. Whether this analysis is followed by
citing courts is an open question.
E. Second Choice Minority
In the final subgroup of "relative disparity" cases, the preferred views of the
minority would produce a disposition different from that of the plurality or that
of the dissent. The minority nevertheless concur with the plurality's disposition
because it more closely expresses the minority's preferred views than does the
result favored by the dissent. In this sense, majority agreement is produced by
express compromise and represents in part the literal second choice of the
minority justices.
These "second choice minority" cases are cited predominantly for the views
expressed in their plurality opinion.251 There are two cases in this subgroup:
Screws v. United States5 2 and Klapprott v. United States.25
Screws involved a police officer who had beaten a Negro while arresting him,
the prisoner dying as a result. The officer was prosecuted under a federal statute
which prohibited officials from subjecting any person to a deprivation of rights,
privileges or immunities protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
standing and justiciability, are not susceptible of analysis for they are discussed in only some
and not all of the majority concurring opinions.
Several citing cases have pieced together the five separate concurring opinions and con-
cluded that Joint holds that the action there by the Attorney General was a violation of due
process. National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 215 F.2d 485, 487 (App. D.C., 1954) (In the dis-
sent it was stated: "Lack of due process so fatal in Joint... has been ostensibly made up for in
the contemplated proceedings."); Green SpringDairy v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 471,475 (C.A.
4th, 1953) ("In many decisions it has been held that the right to due notice.., and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in a fair and open hearing are assured to every litigant by the Federal
Constitution," citing joint.) Accord: Parker v. Lester, 98 F.Supp. 300, 306 (N.D. Cal., 1951);
United States ex rel. Bittelman v. District Director of Immigration & Naturalization, 99
F.Supp. 306, 308 (S.D.N.Y., 1951).
Even greater weight supports the theory that the case is a holding only for its general result.
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 553 (1952) (dissent of Justice Black); Barsky v. Board of
Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Kutcher v. Gray, 199 F.2d 783, 788 (App. D.C., 1952); United
States Lines Co. v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 385, 386 (C.A. 2d, 1952); United States v. Gordon,
190 F.2d 16, 21 (C.A. 8th, 1951). In re Iwo, 199 Misc. 940, 946, 106 N.Y.S.2d 953, 959 (1951);
Hecht v. Monahan, 307 N.Y. 461,468, 121 N.E.2d 421, 424 (1951). See also Adler v. Board of
Education, 342 U.S. 485, 505 (1951) (Frankfurter dissent); United States v. Remington, 191
F.2d 246, 252 (C.A. 2d, 1951); New American Library v. Allan, 114 F.Supp. 823, 828 (N.D.
Ohio, 1953); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F.Supp. 445, 451 (App. D.C., 1952).
251 It will be noted that in most instances even what is typically a general-result citation will
be in effect a citation to the plurality opinion, since the actual result reached is favored as a
first choice only by the plurality.
252 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
253 335 U.S. 601 (1949), modified 336 U.S. 942 (1949).
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States by reason of his color.25 4 Following conviction the officer appealed on the
grounds that the statute was unconstitutional because of vagueness. The Su-
preme Court remanded for a new trial on a 4-1-1-(3) split.
Justices Douglas, Stone, Black and Reed upheld the constitutionality of the
statute on the condition that it be narrowly construed. They would require that
"willfully" be defined to mean a specific intent to violate the statute and further
that specific federal rights, as announced in the Constitution or federal court
decisions, must be violated in order to invoke the statute. They held that the
jury had not been properly instructed and therefore remanded for a new trial.
Justice Rutledge agreed that the statute was not too vague. Since he could see
no possibility of confusion in the jury's instructions he would have affirmed the
conviction. In order to create a majority, however, he acquiesced in the granting
of a new trial. Justice Murphy also saw nothing vague or uncertain "about tak-
ing life without due process." He thus agreed with Rutledge and would have
affirmed the conviction on the ground that the failure below to charge "willfull-
ness" was inconsequential. In dissent, Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jack-
son argued that the statute was unconstitutional because of vagueness. They
also pointed out that this defendant could be punished under state homicide
statutes. They stated that Congress did not intend that the federal government
prosecute so long as the violation in question was also a violation of a state law.
Their opinion was that the act in question was intended to operate against a
usurping state law and not a usurping state official.
Screws represents a decision wherein the result is determined by the express
compromise of a minority justice. Although Rutledge wanted to affirm, he none-
theless agreed with the plurality to remand for a new trial instead of accepting
the alternative of reversal urged by the dissent. Thus, Rutledge's concurrence
was literally his second choice. Furthermore, note that Screws is an almost clear-
majority decision. The difference between views of Rutledge and those of the
plurality is not one of basic disagreement.
Screws, has been cited extensively.25 A large majority of these citations are
general or cover secondary points. In addition, a considerable number of cases
have used Screws authoritatively. Such use has been almost unanimously a
citation of the plurality opinion as the holding,25 s the one exception being a
214 "Whoever, under color of any law... wilfully subjects any inhabitant of any State,
Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities protected by
the Constitution and laws of the United States... by reason of his color... [may be] fined
less than $1000, imprisoned less than one year or both .... " 62 Stat. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A.
§242 (1950).
25s One-hundred-twenty-eight citations were examined.
256 United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 81, 87 (1951) (opinion of Justice Douglas, Reed,
Burton and Clark. No Supreme Court majority opinion has cited the plurality opinion as the
holding.); United States v. Hunter, 214 F.2d 356,358 (C.A. 5th, 1954); Clark v. United States,
193 F.2d 294, 295 (C.A. 5th, 1951); Koehler v. United States, 189 F.2d 711, 713 (C.A. 5th,
1951); Pullens v. United States, 164 F.2d 756, 759, 760 (C.A. 5th, 1947); Hemans v. United
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citation of the general result which did not specifically confine its interpretation
of Screws to that rationale.25 7
Klapprott involved an action to set aside a default judgment which had been
rendered in denaturalization proceedings. In those proceedings, the defendant
had been served with notice but had failed to reply within the required sixty
day period. Prior to the end of the period he had been arrested on federal crimi-
nal charges and confined in jail. Without hearings or the reception of evidence
a default judgment had been entered depriving him of citizenship and cancelling
his certificate of naturalization. More than four years later, while still a govern-
ment prisoner and awaiting deportation, he petitioned to have the default order
set aside.
Justices Black and Douglas stated that under Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure the default judgment could be set aside even after the
applicable one year limitation period if it was void or fell within the "any other
reason" provision of the Rule. They concluded that a denaturalization judg-
ment should not be issued where the defendant has not appeared, without first
requiring the government to prove its case. They would thus set aside the de-
fault judgment here and allow the petitioner an opportunity to defend on the
merits. justices Rutledge and Murphy concurred and agreed in substance with
the Black opinion. They, however, would have gone further, equating de-
naturalization proceedings with criminal prosecutions and concluding therefore
that the rules of civil procedure which permit judgment by default should not
apply. Their preferred disposition of the case would be to reverse the judgment
and dismiss, but they agreed to the disposition favored by the Black opinion,
in order to create a majority. justice Burton agreed with the dissenters "that
a judgment of denaturalization may be entered by default without a further
showing than was made in this case" but concurred with the majority solely
because of "the special circumstances here shown on behalf of this petitioner."
Justices Reed, Vinson and Jackson dissented on the grounds that the petitioner
failed to meet the requirements of Rule 60(b); that the protections of the
criminal law do not apply in such a civil proceeding; and that there is no reason
States, 163 F.2d 228, 240 (C.A. 6th, 1947); Westminster School District of Orange City v.
Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 784 (C.A. 9th, 1947); United States v. Pincourt, 159 F.2d 917, 920
(C.A. 3d, 1946); United States v. Schneiderman, 102 F.Supp. 87, 93 (S.D. Cal., 1951); United
States v. Spector, 99 F.Supp. 778, 782 (S.D. Cal., 1951); United States v. Lynch, 94
F.Supp. 1011, 1013 (N.D. Ga., 1950); United States v. Painters Local Union No. 481, 79
F.Supp. 516, 526 (D. Conn., 1948); United States v. New York Great A. & P. T. Co., 67
F. Supp. 626, 678 (E.D. Ill., 1946); People v. Building Maint. Contractors Ass'n, 41 Cal.2d
719, 724, 264 P.2d 31, 35 (1953); Locklin v. Pridgeon, 158 Fla. 737, 739, 30 So.2d 102, 103
(1947); State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 57, 245 P.2d 788, 792 (1952); State v. Lanesboro Prod-
uce & Hatchery Co., 221 Minn. 246, 254, 273, 21 N.W.2d 792, 796, 804 (1946); State v.
Anthony, 179 Ore. 282, 298, 169 P.2d 587, 594 (1946).
257 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99 (1951). This view was joined by Justices
Douglas, Vinson, Burton, Clark and Reed. Note, however, that all of them except Vinson had
cited the plurality opinion as a holding in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70,81, 87 (1951).
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for the government to present evidence in a default proceeding. Justice Frank-
furter, in a separate opinion, argued that a default judgment can be enforced in
a denaturalization proceeding but agreed with justices Black and Douglas that
Rule 60(b) may be applicable here. He, however, would first require the peti-
tioner to establish that he was not guilty of negligence in failing to defend at the
original denaturalization proceedings. He would thus remand to hear the
merits of petitioner's claim.258
Klapprott is, in summary, a 2-2-1-(3-1) decision. Analytically, the rationales
of the concurring majority opinion present the "broad/narrow" telescoping
effect discussed above. Beginning with the "narrowest," these opinions may be
lined up: Burton, then Black, and then Rutledge, with each differing only
insofar as the next is willing to go even further. There is thus clear-majority
agreement as to the Burton view, agreement of four justices as to the Black
position, and two-justice agreement on the Rutledge view. Also present is the
express compromise of the Rutledge opinion to reach the disposition favored
by Black, Douglas and Burton. In this sense, the three justices last named
create a plurality in terms of the actual disposition, and the Rutledge opinion
is a "second choice minority" which is decisive as to the result.
Exposition of the manner in which Klapprott has been cited by later courts
is difficult because of its complexity. Citation of either the Burton or Black
rationale would appear to be what has previously been denoted citation of the
plurality opinion, because these views together are a plurality in terms of result.
Such citation is universally the practice in the many later cases referring to
Klapprolt, the majority of which refer to what is in effect the Burton position 59
and the rest to the Black view 60 Only one case has noted the lack of a clear
majority.2 1
258 The decision in Klapprott was subsequently modified in accord with the views expressed
by Justice Frankfurter in the original decision. 336 U.S. 942 (1949). The case was remanded
with directions to receive evidence on the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in the
petition to vacate the original judgment. Justices Black, Douglas, Rutledge and Murphy dis-
sented from the modified order. Although the case on rehearing became a clear-majority
decision, the original case is significant for this analysis since later courts typically cite it
without reference to the absence of a clear majority or to the subsequent modification.
21 Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197 (1950) (Instant case distinguished from
Klapprott on the ground that Klapprott involved "extraordinary circumstances." It is inter-
esting to note that Black, Douglas and Frankfurter joined in a dissent which did not mention
Klapprott.); Morse-Starrett Prod. Co. v. Steccane, 205 F.2d 244,249 (C.A. 9th, 1953); Berry
Hill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217, 219 (C.A. 6th, 1952); Zurini v. United States, 189 F.2d
722, 726 (C.A. 8th, 1951); United States ex rel. Ayner v. Shaughnessy, 175 F.2d 211, 212
(C.A. 2d, 1949); United States v. Giesler, 174 F.2d 992, 998 (C.A. 7th, 1949); Von Wedell v.
McGrath, 100 F.Supp. 434, 436 (D.N.J., 1951); Allen v. Trivett, 98 A.2d 787, 789 (Mun.
App. D.C., 1953); In re Manfredini, 24 N.J.Super. 59, 64,93 A.2d 623, 625 (1952); Blacker v.
Rod, 87 A.2d 634, 636 (Mun. App. DC., 1951).
"0United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331, 332, 334 (C.A. 2d, 1953) (Statement that the
Supreme Court "held" that, under the facts, Rule 60(b) applied. Only Black had been explicit
on this point. Note though, that this was the only subsequent case which specifically comment-
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CONCLUSION
The analytical categorization of no-clear-majority decisions set out in this
comment reveals that similar types of decisions have been cited in a similar
manner by later courts. It thus affords a possible basis for understanding actual
citation practices in regard to no-dear-majority decisions. It at least makes
ed that the Klapprott Court was divided.); United States v. Backofen, 176 F.2d 263,264 (C.A.
3d, 1949) (Reference to the Black rationale on Rule 60(b) as follows: "The Supreme Court
held that Rule 60(b) should be applied."); United States v. Zurim, 93 F.Supp. 1, 3 (D. Neb.,
1950) (Described the Black view that even in default cases the government must meet the
usual burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt as "the doctrine set forth by the
United States Supreme Court," and applied this test to the facts of the case.); Sanders v.
Clark, 85 F.Supp. 253, 256 (E.D. Pa., 1949) (Same interpretation as the Zurim case supra).
See also Ackerman v. United States, 178 F.2d 983, 984 (C.A. 5th, 1949) (Black opinion
referred to as the "majority opinion."); Latta v. Western Inv. Co., 173 F.2d 99, 102 (C.A.
9th, 1949) (Discussion of Klapprott on Rule 60(b) in the following terms: "IThe court...
through Mr. Justice Black stated .... "); Klein v. Rappaport, 90 A.2d 834, 835 (Mun. App.
D.C., 1952) (reference to the argument that even where there is default the government must
still prove its case).
26 Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197 (1950).
Two no-clear-majority decisions involve a "second choice" by the plurality. The first, Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948), will not be discussed herein because its split was based
entirely on differences in interpretation of the facts and it has thus presented little difficulty
for later citing courts. It is, however, significant that only one out of fifty-two cases have noted
the lack of a clear majority in Von Moltke. Von Moltke v. United States, 189 F.2d 56 (C.A.
6th, 1951) (the same case on remand).
The second is Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954). There, the owner
of a ship, which had collided with a pier and capsized, filed in a federal district court to limit his
liability under the Federal Limited Liability Act, 49 Stat. 1479 (1936),46 U.S.C.A. §183 (Supp.,
1955); Rev. Stat. §4826 (1873), 46 U.S.C.A. §186 (1928). Later, an action by representatives
of five seamen who had drowned was filed in the same district court against the owner's insur-
ance company. The plaintiffs in the latter action relied on the Louisiana direct action statute,
La. Ins. Code (1950) §55, which authorized a direct suit against the insurer "within the terms
of the policy." The district court dismissed this action. The court of appeals reversed. The
Supreme Court split 4-1-(4) and remanded for a continuance.
Justices Frankfurter, Reed, Jackson and Burton argued that the Louisiana statute con-
flicted with the federal limited liability statute because it did not bring all the claims into court
at once as did the federal statute and, further, it permitted direct actions against insurers of
shipowners, which would result in increased premiums ot the shipowners. It was contended
that the latter would conflict with the federal policy of limited liability for shipowners. The
insurance benefits of the shipowners might be exhausted by it in the direct action suit and yet
the owners would still be liable in the limitation proceeding for any additional claims to the
extent of the value of the ship. Thus their insurance coverage would avail them nothing.
These four justices would have dismissed the complaints, but in order to get a majority to agree
on a disposition they followed the plan advocated by Justice Clark. Clark, concurring singly,
concluded that a conflict between the Louisiana and the federal statutes could be avoided. He
did not agree that the federal policy which would make the limitation proceeding the exclusive
forum was strong enough to invalidate a state law. Rather, he would uphold the state statute
by instructing the district court to conclude the limitation proceeding, after which the direct
action against the insurers could be brought. Justices Black, Warren, Douglas and Minton
dissented. They argued that the Louisiana statute did not conflict with the federal law. It was
their view that even if there should be recoveries from the limitation fund the shipowners
would not be deprived of any right given by the federal act. They would not destroy the clear
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clear that these practices do not accord with the theory put forth in the texts.
It further demonstrates that in many instances, no-clear-majority decisions are
cited for views which are not agreed to by a majority of the justices participat-
ing in the decision of the cited case. Also of significance is the fact that so few
citing courts expressly note the lack of a clear majority in the no-clear-majority
decisions being cited.
Whether the manner in which no-clear-majority cases have been used as
precedent has resulted from conscious choice, faulty reading or pure disregard
is an open question. It is interesting to note, with reference to these alterna-
tives, that the analysis and categorization of this comment suggest different
assumptions for the explanation of each group of no-clear-majority decisions.
Thus, in Part I, cases presenting conflicting and equally strong majority views
are cited mainly for their general results, making plausible the assumption of
conscious choice. In Part II, cases presenting two majorities, one as to result
and the other as to rationale, are cited in a haphazard fashion, thus pointing to
the assumption of faulty reading. And in Part III, cases with an inequality of
scope are cited primarily for their plurality opinions, thus suggesting the as-
sumption of pure disregard (at least in the "silent concurrence," "technical" and
"'narrow" minority subgroups).
It is, nevertheless, more reasonable to assume that later courts approached
each group of no-clear-majority decisions with the same general state of mind.
The significance of the suggestion that different assumptions as to approach are
dictated by different groups of decisions, would appear to be only that it indi-
cates a general confusion as to such matters and that later courts have used no
one all-pervading approach.
Other possible explanations for the citation patterns found to exist may be
suggested. First, later courts have used the view stated in the opinion which
appears first in the Reports. Second, later courts have cited the opinion which
is supported by the greatest number of justices. Both these explanations rest on
empirical facts, and are accurate more often than not. The final explanation is
that the particular factors influencing a court's citation of a no-clear-majority
policy of the Louisiana direct action statute which was also felt to be in harmony with the
policy of maritime law.
Maryland Casualty quite clearly illustrates a second choice by the plurality. However,
note that the dissenters could have compromised as easily. The disposition favored by the
minority, i.e., a postponement of the direct action against the insurer, was closer to the reason-
ing of the dissenters, who say no conflict of state and federal statutes exists at all, than to the
plurality favoring outright dismissal.
Since Maryland Casualty is a recent case, few citations are available. Although no signifi-
cant trend can be seen, the minority opinion may perhaps be pivotal for future decisions since
only this opinion favored the resultant disposition. See Lovless v. Employers' Liability Assur-
ance Corp., 218 F.2d 714, 715 (C.A. 5th, 1955); Williams v. Steamship Mutual Underwriting
Ass'n, 45 Wash.2d 209, 230, 273 P.2d 803, 815 (1954) (noting the Supreme Court split). This
trend may be emphasized by the close agreement between the minority and dissent, so close
in fact as almost to put Maryland Casualty into the "dual majority" category discussed in
Part II of this comment.
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decision are so numerous and varied as to be impossible to calculate and reduce
to any general rule.
The discussion in this comment has not considered the manner in which no-
clear-majority decisions should be cited. At best, it would appear that they
should be used as precedent only after a careful analysis and evaluation which
recognizes the absence of clear-majority agreement. This is sometimes done,
but more often apparently disregarded. The difficulties inherent in the former
inquiry and the dangers incident to the latter practice raise the further question
of the propriety of handing down no-clear-majority decisions at all: Alterna-
tively, it may be suggested that much can be done by the Court to indicate the
points of agreement and disagreement in such cases. It is hoped that it will no
longer be necessary to label them no-clear-majority decisions, but rather clear,
no-majority decisions.
TAXATION OF MULTIPLE TRUSTS
The five-year throwback provision of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code has
re-focused attention on an old problem'--use of a number of accumulating
trusts which, as a result of the progressive rate structure, are each taxed at a
lower rate than would be applicable if only a single trust were used.2 Although
avoidance of the additional surtax in this manner' was possible long before the
1954 Code, prior to 19544 it was possible to use a single accumulating trust, give
I Interest in the multiple trust problem reached a peak in the late 1930's as a result of a
Congressional investigation. Consult Hearings before the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion
and Avoidance, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). For discussion of the complexion of the problem
at that time, consult Multiple Trusts and the Minimization of Federal Taxes, 40 Col. L. Rev.
309 (1940), and Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 41,
71-75 (1937).
2 Although statistical evidence of the use of multiple trusts is understandably unavailable,
the attention the device has received suggests that it is highly popular among tax-planners.
For example, the Wall Street Journal began a recent feature article on the effect of taxation
on business and property planning with the following: "Sylvanus G. Felix is building a $3.5
million, 17-story office building in Oklahoma City. He's not alone in this venture. Far from it.
His co-entrepreneurs: 27 trusts (for the benefit of his children) and eight corporations (he's
president of each one). Mr. Felix could eliminate a lot of bookkeeping by handling the project
alone. But he'd rather not. By splitting the building's income among 36 taxpayers, he figures
he'll cut total income taxes 'by more than 50%.' "The Wall Street Journal, p. 1, col. 6 (Mid-
west ed., Jan. 5, 1956).
3 A single taxpayer with no dependents receiving $100,000 per year from personal services
and $100,000 ordinary income from investments pays approximately $156,000 in taxes at
present rates. If all the investment property were transferred and taxed to a single trust, the
saving would be approximately $22,000 per year. Use of ten trusts would save an additional
$41,000 per year. The saving exists not only because the marginal tax rate is lower, but also
because each trust receives a deduction for personal exemption. Int. Rev. Code §642(b),
26 U.S.CA. §642(b) (1954).
4 Consult Aronsohn and Michaelson, Partnerships Estates and Trusts (Practicing Law
Institute Fundamentals of Federal Taxation Series) 48-54 (1953 ed.), for an explanation of the
65-day and 12-month rules of Int. Rev. Code §162, 26 U.S.C.A. §162 (1939) as amended.
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